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I. INTRODUCTION
"Coordination is the act of working together."
A. BACKGROUND
Every individual has an innate sense of what the phrase
"well-coordinated" means. It is used to describe a winning
sports team, a smoothly run political platform, and even
military exercises. What we appear to be doing is simply
noticing how well coordinated the actions of a group of
individuals are. Often, however, good coordination is nearly
invisible, while situations where coordination is obviously
lacking are often in the spotlight. In the civilian sector we
most easily spot poor coordination; for example: waiting for
an airliner to run on time, while hotel reservations that we
made months in advance disappear. Players and owners of a
professional sports team sometimes communicate through the
press. In the military poor coordination can also be
administrative in nature; however, military operations that
lack coordination can also mean the difference between life
and death. This is not meant to be theatrical in nature, but
to emphasize that coordination is needed in military
operations.
In order to proceed with this thesis, it is helpful to
have a more precise idea of what exactly is meant by
"coordination". Several definitions are listed below to help
frame the position:
"The operation of complex systems made up of components"
(NSF-IRIS, 1989)
"The joint efforts of independent communicating actors
towards mutually defined goals."
(NSF-IRIS, 1989)
"Composing purposeful actions into larger purposeful
wholes"
(A. Holt, personal communication, 1989)
Although these suggested definitions of "coordination" help to
clarify the problem military Command and Control systems are
faced with, they are not conclusive. Each individual, as
stated earlier, has his own opinion on the actual aspects of
coordination. For this authors purposes, it is most useful to
start with the simple definition that preceded this
discussion:
"Coordination is the act of working together"
Even though it is often important to distinguish between
concepts like cooperation, collaboration, and competition,
including them all in this broad definition of coordination,
allows us to examine their relationships.
Much of the previous background on combined operations
focuses entirely on reports describing individual nations
operating in a geographical or time oriented environment. By
excluding the primary remaining divisional factor of Command
and Control, that of a functional relationship, attained
efficiency in a battlegroup is degraded. It is imperative
that the United States learn to operate functionally with
other nations. World War II first identified the lack of
coordination required to conduct multi-national operations;
yet, even after a successful ending to the war, these Command
and Control coordination problems were not fully analyzed.
This thesis focuses on gaining an understanding of the
Command and Control basic functions that a Naval Force would
need in order to operate, specifically in a multi-national
arena. In addition to specifying these baseline functions,
this thesis will also propose an architectural template to be
used in such combined operations.
B. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The basic question that guided this research involved the
architecture that must be employed if multi-national
operations are to be coherently successful. Specifically, the
author created a Command and Control functional architecture
template that would be used during battlegroup operations with
one or more other countries. To conform to the current
thinking incorporated within the hierarchy of the Navy, the
author proposes an architecture modeled after the Copernicus
Architecture currently being developed in the Navy, and the
Navy Cooperative Engagement Architecture structure developed
simultaneously. The author also addressed the information and
data flows within the multi-national naval force, the
interfaces between the information and data flow, and finally
developed one possible map that allocated functions performed,
to the resource within the combined battlegroup. A secondary
question covered in the development of the architecture was
the validation of the template. To answer this question the
author related fusion performance to military effectiveness by
the Military Operations Research Society's Standards,
discussing the dimensional parameters of the template, the
Measures Of Performance (MOPs) , Measures Of Effectiveness
(MOEs) , and Measures Of Force Effectiveness (MOFEs) . To
complete this question, recommendations for modeling of the
template effectiveness by Command and Control models was
given.
C. SCOPE
The domain of this thesis is the development of a multi-
national command and control architecture for use in combined
battlegroup operations. This thesis is generic and
descriptive in nature, and concerns the ability of multi-
national forces to operate efficiently in a functional
division of warfare areas. Due to limited resources, the
thesis does not test the validity of the template recommended,
but gives suggestions for follow on research in order to
validate the fidelity and accuracy of the template. The
research for this subject was limited by a lack of published
domain related data or research. The author also chose to
remain at the unclassified level; thereby allowing for greater
dissemination.
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The results of this thesis can best be summed up by the
following statement:
A Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
Intelligence system should be a fused, real time, ground
truth picture of the warrior's battle space and the
ability to order, respond and coordinate horizontally and
vertically to the degree necessary to prosecute his
warfighting mission in that battle space. (Macke, 1992)
The combined arena is one of the best environments in which to
view this concept.
From this foundations of this idea, the author found that
from the end of World War II to the present, including
Operation Desert Shield / Storm, coordination of multi-
national assets was conducted at a high level, and then passed
down each individual countries chain-of-command; thus,
negating individual unit coordination.
Each historical conflict that was briefly discussed did
have a command and control architecture in place. This
historical background provided the transition to the
development of the current command and control architecture in
place in the navy. By describing the components and
principles of a generic architecture, as well as the
integration of the architecture into physical reality, the
author described the current command and control architecture,
concentrating on the liabilities inherent to the system. The
liabilities of the current architecture are,
• Flexibility of the doctrine to the threat
• Traffic separation




• Information display (Copernicus, 1991)
The author then discusses the Copernicus Architecture and the
Cooperative Engagement structure, two new concepts in the
development of a command and control architecture. In
formulating the base template, Copernicus ideology is
presented in a Cooperative Engagement structure.
Following discussion of the Copernicus architecture and
the Cooperative Engagement structure, the author presents a
detailed structural analysis of the problem. The Stimulus-
Hypothesis-Option-Response (SHOR) model is presented in order
to give the decision-maker the ability to deal with
information input uncertainty and consequence-of-action
uncertainty in military problem solving. After a brief
discussion of object orientation, a structural analysis of the
Command and Control arena concludes with information and data
flows required in a battle group, and the necessary time
constrained functions associated with these flows.
With the background material presented in the above
fashion, the author presents a multi-national architecture
for implementation at the unit level. The architecture was
formulated at just above physical hardware levels, in order to
allow the decision-maker the flexibility to determine what
resources are available for each basic function. In it, the
decision-maker is given a set of mechanisms (resources) that
have to act on the inputs to produce a desired output. Acting
on those mechanisms, however, are a list of controls that give
the decision-maker the guidelines for effective use of the
resources available.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
In Chapter II the author discusses the historical
background on Command and Control failures and success's,
which in turn provide the foundations for understanding the
process through the material, and the architectural template
developed. Chapter III contains a general overview of an
architecture, followed closely by the United States Navy's
current Command and Control Architecture. The author then
discusses the liability's in the existing system, and the
proposed changes. Chapter III then ends with an summary
evaluation of the current framework. Chapter IV follows the
structural analysis used to determine the information and data
flows required for combined operations, as well as the
interfaces between them. The structured analysis was oriented
towards the decision maker, using the Stimulus-Hypothesis-
Option-Response (SHOR) model as a base for problem solving.
This model was selected because of its ability to deal
explicitly with both information input uncertainty and
consequence-of-action uncertainty in military problem solving.
Chapter V is the heart of the thesis. This is the chapter
where the author develops an architecture template that covers
the multi-national arena, answering the primary research
question, as well as recommending Command and Control Models
to validate the template. Chapter VI contains the conclusions
and consolidates the answers to the research questions. The
required baseline functions are presented in Appendix A, and
the detailed architectural template is given in Appendix B.
II HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles
you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of
the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning
or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy
and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be
in peril.
- Sun Tzu
A. POST WWII TO VIETNAM
At the end of World War II, the United States Navy
experienced one of the most difficult periods of its history.
The budgetary rigidness of the immediate postwar years, the
belief of some observers that atomic weapons had made navies
obsolete, and the absence of major opposing surface fleets
elsewhere in the world, resulted in a drastic demobilization
of the American Navy. This decline was halted abruptly by the
onset of the Korean War and the concurrent national decision
to rearm for the Cold War.
Accompanying the declining force levels following World
War II was the enactment of the National Security Act in 1947.
Under that act, the Navy became part of the newly formed
National Military Establishment, while the Joint Chiefs of
Staff received statutory recognition and authority to continue
their direction of unified commands. (Cardwell, 1984, p. 11)
1. Beginning of Cold War
The March 1947 Truman Doctrine is usually thought of
as the start of the Cold War. However, the thrust of the
Truman Doctrine program was directed at Middle Eastern states:
Greece and Turkey. In 1950, a report prepared by the
secretaries of state and defense was transmitted to the
members of the National Security Council at the direction of
President Harry Truman. The subject of the report was "United
States Objectives and Programs for National Security," the
shorthand title being NSC 68. In its conclusion the report
stated:
We must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the
political, economic, and military strength of the free
world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to
wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it
with convincing evidence of the determination and ability
of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a
world dominated by its will (Hagen, 1984, p. 304).
NSC 68 became the American blueprint for the next decade, the
American plan for waging the Cold War: "for every
consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our
national security demands that we achieve our objectives by
the strategy of the cold war, building up our military
strength in order that it may not have to be used" (Hagen,
1984, p. 304)
.
2. United States Navy Force Deployment Change
In the Mediterranean, the force that eventually became
known as the Sixth Fleet had its genesis in the immediate
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post-World War II period. In the first months after the war
Britain's Royal Navy maintained its traditional presence in
the region, while a limited number of American Units operated
in the western and central Mediterranean. In the spring of
1946, however, the United States indicated its growing concern
with the eastern Mediterranean by sending USS Missouri (BB 62)
to Turkey, a nation that appeared to be endangered by Soviet
demands for joint control of the Turkish straits. That fall
the aircraft carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt visited Greece,
which faced a communist-led insurgency. Late in September of
1946, the Navy Department issued a statement indicating that
naval deployments could be expected routinely throughout the
Mediterranean. (Hagen, 1984, pp. 290-301)
The United States naval presence in the Mediterranean
continued to expand as British capabilities declined and as
American apprehension grew regarding the goals of the Soviet
Union and its allies. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal,
one of the principle architects of America's postwar policy,
indicated that the increase in United States naval activity to
the Mediterranean was the desire to support American forces in
Europe and to carry out American policy and diplomacy.
Following President Harry S. Truman's offer of assistance to
Greece and Turkey in 1947, the Navy provided military supplies
and advice to those countries and made frequent cruises to
Greek and Turkish waters. In late 1947, an American carrier
was permanently assigned to the Mediterranean. The following
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year brought an amphibious capability to the force.
Strategically, operations in the eastern Mediterranean
established an American naval presence on the southern flank
of the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. (Hagen,
1984, pp. 290-301)
Europe and the Far East were by no means the sole
geographic areas of American naval interest following World
War II. In the central pacific, where the front lines of the
Japanese Empire had been located during the war, the Navy
assumed the responsibility for the civil administration of the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands until replaced by the
department of the Interior in 1951. Throughout the late 1940s
and into the next decade, naval surface, air, and submarine
forces also deployed to the Arctic regions to resupply weather
and defense installations, and to conduct exercises.
3 . Korean War
On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces launched an
invasion of South Korea across the 38th parallel. Two days
later, President Truman directed naval forces in the far east
to support South Korea and prevent offensive operations by
either the Chinese Nationalist or Communist Forces in the area
of the Formosa straits. On June 29, the first naval gunfire
mission was conducted in support of the allies. The first
part of July brought the appointment of General Douglas
MacArthor as commander of the United States Forces assisting
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the Republic of Korea. In addition to assuming the role of
unified commander of United States Forces, General MacArthor
also was appointed as United Nations commander over all the
allied forces. (Cardwell, 1984, p. 13) The command structure
established to control the assets under the United Nations














(1) Far East Ground Force Command was not activated. Land component command
was the Far Eat Command
FIGURE 2.1: KOREA COMMAND ORGANIZATION (1950)
l COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR THEATER WARFARE, THE QUEST FOR UNITY OF COMMAND
Although general in nature, figure 2.1 illustrates the lack of
coordination between tactical units; therefore, depicting the
problems of interaction that occurred.
Because of the United States domination of the United
Nations Command, the command structure could be further




Jury 1 950, passed resolution that made the US president executive agent in




of his NSC U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff
Far East Command
^N . J United Nations^. Command
Operational Control of coalition forces on
and near the Korean peninsula
Operational Control of all US forces in the
Far East
SOURCE
FIGURE 2.2: POLITICAL/STRATEGIC DIRECTION IN KOREA (1950)
COMMAND AND CONTROL Of THEATER FORCES: ISSUES IN MIDEAST COALITION COMMAND
As can be seen in figure 2.2, the entire thrust of the
coalition is United States objectives, as the United States
was called upon by the United Nations to act as commander of
all forces in theater.
4. Development of the Middle East Command
The subregional focus of the October 1951 Middle East
Command proposal was the defense of the Suez Canal Zone. The
Middle East Command was not conceived of as a political
alliance as in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. The concept was initially put forward as a
proposal to Egypt, hoping that by converting the British
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military presence into an allied enterprise that included
Egypt; therefore allowing the coalition to keep a military
installation on Egyptian soil. (Snyder, 1987, pp. 84-87)
a. Defense of the Suez Canal
The focus on the defense of the Canal Zone during
the Middle East Command proposals was as much a result of
explicit strategic planning as it was a function of Britain's
political problems with the Egyptians. In fact, earlier, in
March of 1951, the National Security Council had reestablished
in NSC 47/5 that "because the United States commitments in
other areas it is the United States' interest that the United
Kingdom have primary responsibility for Israel and the Arab
states" ( Foreign Relations of the United States . 1951, p. 95)
.
With NSC 47/5 American military plans called for almost no
contributions for the defense of the Middle East. This
remained true in 1952 when the Middle East Command (MEC) was
repackaged as a less ambitious training and joint staff
planning organization called the Middle East Defense
Organization (MEDO)
.
b. MEC Repackaged as the MEDO
The American military establishment continually
resisted any attempt in this period to give American combat
units responsibilities in the Middle East. United States
global war plans in 1952 did not contemplate the use of
American forces in the region. General Omar Bradley viewed
15
United States participation in the Middle East security as
largely symbolic: "The United States cannot send troops to the
area. . .The United States, however, would be willing to
contribute to the staff of a Middle East Defense Organization,
largely as a means of securing the participation of others in
such an arrangement" ( Foreign Relations of the United States .
1952-1954, p. 246). It appears that the reason for this type
of military thinking hinged on the idea that a war could still
be won despite the loss of the Middle East, whereas the same
could not be said for Europe.
5. Baghdad Pact
The United States military strategy in the Middle East
under the Eisenhower administration was a product of two
fundamental inputs; Secretary of State John Foster Dulles tour
of the Middle East in 1953 and the "New Look" defense posture
that the administration was implementing in Washington.
Dulles concluded from his trip that the future focus of a
regional defense must be on those states most directly
threatened by the Soviet Union. The "New Look" posture was
the idea of deterrence through air nuclear armament, as
opposed to the more costly buildup of both nuclear and
conventional forces.
Under these circumstances, the chances that the United
States might assume a greater role in the defense of the
Middle East, were slight. This served as one of the
16
inhibiting factors on American adherence to a series of
treaties between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Great
Britain in 1955 that became known as the Baghdad Pact. (Gold,
1988, p. 18)
6. Eisenhower Doctrine
Out of a concern for Soviet exploitation of the
western vacuum in the Arab states, President Eisenhower
addressed Congress on January 5, 1957 and called for a joint
resolution authorizing economic and military aide as well as
the use of United States armed forces in support of any Middle
Eastern state faced with overt armed aggression from a country
controlled by communism. This request was approved in March
of 1957 and has become known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.
(Snyder, 1987, pp. 85-86)
a. JCS Soviet Strategy Shifts
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been consulted
before the declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and only in
its aftermath did they begin to consider its military
applications. In the event of an extreme Soviet reaction to
the president's statement, in the form of direct military
aggression, the JCS noted that the result would be general war
for which detailed plans existed. The danger existed,
however, that a Middle Eastern state under Soviet influence
might attack neighboring states, a scenario that no detailed
plans existed for problem resolution.
17
b. JCS Recommends an establishment of a Multiservice
Unified Command for the Middle East Area
As a result of the Doctrine, the JCS recommended
the establishment of a multiservice unified command for the
Middle East area (MECOM) that would assume responsibility for
both strategic planning and coordination of military programs
with local states. The Department of Defense implemented this
idea by expanding the responsibilities of Commander-in-Chief
of US Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
(USCINCNELM) . For the rest of the 1950' s, USCINCNELM was both
the component commander of the US European Command and
Commander of US Specified Command. Early in I960, CINCNELM
was directed to establish unified multiservice staff for
Middle Eastern planning separate from his exclusive naval
staff. This arrangement, however, was only temporary. As
soon as MECOM was established, they assumed this
responsibility. (Gold, 1988, p. 22)
c. Kennedy USSTRICOM for Brushfire Wars
Although the idea was born under Eisenhower, the
forces to support the Doctrine originated under the Kennedy
administration. The results of the "New Look" program made
the Kennedy-McNamara era lean toward a conventional arms
buildup, as well as the increasing likelihood of Soviet-
sponsored limited war threats to the Third World. In October
1961, Kennedy created a new unified command, the US Strike
18
Command (USSTRICOM) , chiefly for operations in "brushfire" wars
in the Third World. In 1963, STRICOM took over responsibility
of the Middle East from CINCNELM. (Gold, 1988, pp. 22-23)
7. Nixon Doctrine
In October 1967, two years before Nixon came into
office, he hinted at a strategy larger than the imposing
problem in Vietnam. This strategy became known as the Nixon
Doctrine. In it, Nixon warned that the Vietnam conflict had
imposed severe strains on the United States and that there
were serious questions whether the American public or the
American Congress would support unilateral American
intervention, even at the request of the host government.
Although Asia provided the immediate context for Nixon's
warning, the implications for other declared vital regions,
such as the Middle East, were obvious. Nixon declared that
two conditions would have to be met in the future if the
United States was expected to respond to crises around the
globe:
• a collective effort by the nations of the region to
contain the threat by themselves
• a collective request to the United States for assistance,
in the case that the first alternative failed (Gold,
1988, pp. 23-28)
Needless to say, the requirements outlined in 1967 were
utilized during Desert Shield / Desert Storm.
19
Although there were only two forces allied in the
campaign against the North Vietnamese, it is beneficial to the
establishment of the coordination architecture to illustrate
the combined command structure used in the war. The system













































FIGURE 2.3: COMMAND AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM
SOURCE: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THEATER FORCES: ISSUES IN MIDEAST COALITION COMMAND
Twenty five years after the end of World War II, and combined
coordination of forces only became more inefficient.
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B. POST VIETNAM TO PRE-DESERT SHIELD / STORM: THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTCOM
The growth of Soviet strategic nuclear power, the
enhancement of Soviet conventional capability, and
improvements in Soviet strategic mobility posed new challenges
for the United States Military posture. In regard to the
Middle East, strategic equivalence had created a situation
where past policies of relying on the implied threat of
escalating to general war for deterring direct Soviet attacks
beyond the NATO area had become outdated. As a result, the
National Security Council issued PD-18 in August 1977, which
recommended a strategy of employing US general purpose forces
in non-NATO situations. PD-18 also stipulated that these
forces were to have the capabilities of operating
independently of friendly basing and logistic support in the
geographic area. (Gold, 1988, pp. 29-32)
1. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)
Defense guidance was issued for the formation of a new
command after President Carter announced the formation of a
Rapid Deployment Force in October of 1979. This new command
was formally referred to as the RDJTF, and was headquartered
at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. As the RDJTF
concept took shape, the logistical difficulties of moving
forces 12,000 nautical miles by sea and 8,000 nautical miles
by air, became obvious. With this logistic nightmare facing
21
military planners, the Pentagon decided to alter the concept
of the RDF to a force that could operate in a permissive
environment, one that required some reliance on regional
infrastructure (Snyder, 1987, pp. 116-117). Although the
forces were a new commodity, the idea for reliance on regional
countries had already been noted by President Nixon in 1967.
2. Central Command
The Department of Defense list of priorities for the
RDJTF were as follows:
(1) the security of Israel and the continuation of the
peace process
(2) support for the moderate states of Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Jordan, and Egypt against overt attack by radical states
(3) support for moderate states against internal disorders
and subversion
(4) the limitation of Soviet military influence/ leverage in
the region
(5) deterrence of a Soviet invasion of the Gulf
(Snyder, 1987, p. 117)
In order to be able to undertake these responsibilities, the
Reagan administration upgraded the RDJTF in January 198 3 to
the first new geographic unified command. The commander of
the RDJTF was now the commander of the US Central Command.
22
C. CONCLUSION
The background presented briefly from the close of World
War II to the present is not intended to be a history lesson,
but instead is designed to introduce the reader to some area's
of conflict that have existed related to poor Command and
Control coordination. In these multi-national conflicts, some
form of a combined command and control architecture always
existed. In fact, some of the historical aspects on how the
United States Navy worked with other nations can be found in
our current multi-national operations. Given this historical
background, the current command and control architecture can
be discussed.
23
III. CURRENT COMMAND AND CONTROL ARCHITECTURE
"...the loss of troop control in battle invariably leads
to defeat."
-Lieutenant Colonel L. Titov, Soviet Army
A. GENERIC ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
How complex or simple a structure is depends critically
upon the way in which we describe it. Most of the complex
structures found in the world are enormously redundant, and we
can use this redundancy to simplify their description. But to
use it, to achieve the simplification, we must find the right
representation. The military command and control process is
not exempt from this definition. When broken down into a base
architecture, the manner in which the military operates
follows a certain path; a path illustrated below.
1. Components of an architecture
To develop a new architecture for use in the multi-
national arena takes an understanding of what an architecture
is, how the current command and control process is modeled,
and what is on the drawing board for future use. The United
States Navy has been in the process of composing these
architectures for many years. When the Navy was small, this
process was handled by a small staff knowledgeable of
seamanship, strategy, and tactics. As the Navy expanded by
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numbers as well as structure, the job became more and more
difficult and complex. Different architectures have had their
turn at containing the vast complexity of the Navy, but
currently the focus is on Copernicus. Even with Copernicus in
the forefront, the Cooperative Engagement architecture was
developed at approximately the same time. (Cooperative
Engagement, 1991, p.l) It is from these two architectures
that the author has formulated an actual architecture of the
fleet in 1994, if both policies are implemented.
The goals of a Command and Control architecture is to
develop a collection of documents intended to accomplish the
following:
• Collect basic information
• Describe the functional organization of the force using
required operational functions (ROF's)
• Describe the physical organization of the force to the
generic platform and major systems levels
• Describe connectivity and organization of the force
• Establish essential performance measures at force,
platform, and system levels
• Describe the current performance and capability of the
force
• Compare expected performance to Top Level Warfare
Requirement's (TLWR's) and identify short-falls and
overlaps
• Rank options relative to performance, af fordability, etc.
• Identify required technological emphasis
• Relate current performance to TLWR's
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• Transfer concepts to implementation
(SPAW87A and Curtis, 1989, pp. 6-7)
In order to accomplish those items it is imperative that the
subscriber knows and understands the components of an
architecture.
a. List of Customers
To bound the problem, the architect must know the
domain of influence. For the authors purpose, the List of
Customers will be all those entities that use the architecture
to allocate their resources to individual functions. In the
case of Navy-wide improvement, not only must the problem be
bounded, as stated above, but also adhered to by all involved.
All too often a new and improved procedure is implemented only
to be ignored at various levels, simply due to a high
resistance to change.
b. Concept of Operations
Without a concept of operations the architect
would be developing a bounded problem without a direction. A
Concept of Operations is the verbal statement of a decision-
maker's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation. The
concept is designed to give an overall picture of the
operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of
purpose. Given that direction, the operation can be given
specific tasks.
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c. Measures of Performance
Each resource available to the decision-maker is
assigned a list of functions, which are required to be
completed for task accomplishment; and, each function must
have some Measure of Performance. The Measures of Performance
are operational assessment measures. This allows the
decision-maker to allocate functions to specific resources,
and then monitor the resources progress. In addition to the
Measures of Performance listed for the individual functions,
the decision-maker might also have Measures of Effectiveness
for the entire task and Measures of Force Effectiveness for
the entire battle force. Measures of Effectiveness would be
assessment measures associated with major force components,
i.e., platforms, combat systems, weapon systems, and warfare
systems. Measures of Force Effectiveness are assessment
measures dictated by the Force Top Level Warfare Requirements.
d. Interrelated Functional Flow Diagrams and Data
Description
To allocate the tasks to resources in a manner
that can be easily monitored, the tasks are distributed in a
functional flow diagram. A functional flow diagram, in this
context, utilizes a function as a process by which data-
information is transferred from an input to an output. After
measuring the function outputs in a quantifiable unit of time,
the functional flow diagram is developed. This allows for
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individual data to have requirements and standard flow
directions. Each element of data used as an input or
"functionalized" to an output is described by its physical
attributes. For this authors purpose, the IDEF design was
the most beneficial method available of demonstrating
functional flow diagrams with inherent data descriptions, now
being required by the Director of Defense Information.
e. Physical Description
Each resource must be physically described in the
architecture. A physical description in the case of a ship
platform would entail nationality, command and control nodes
onboard, communication nets available, cryptologic keys
available, and so forth. This ensures that no function is
assigned to an inadequate resource. The main concept is
covered by identifying each entities own capabilities.
2. Architecture Integration
Within this component guideline, the architecture must
be integrated into the day to day operation of the Navy. Just
the idea of change alone would create enormous amounts of
friction. However, this is not the only aspect of integration
that an architecture must endure to be implemented. Probably
the hardest obstacle that a new system must pass through is
cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) . It is the
author's opinion that with technological backfitting a
possible major cost increase, several architectures do not
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even get off the drawing table due to the high cost of
physically implementing the hardware. This enormous backfit
cost came about because of the technological explosion,
resulting in greater amounts of information flow. When the
Navy was first organized, one of the few worries it had was
how to build the ship. After awhile, the designers developed
weapons to be placed on ships. This was soon followed by
entire weapon systems being designed to go on ships. Before
long, the entire ship had to be laid out prior to
construction. Now, the Navy has reached the point that entire
battle groups must first be laid out on paper before
construction. This type of thinking allows for efficient
battle force management, but is costly in the backfit arena.
3. Principles of Architecture
The development of an architecture contains certain
attributes, the most important ones in the authors opinion are
listed here.
a. Modularity
By allowing the system to operate as a loose
federation of entities who have been assigned individual
functions, the decision-maker has given himself the ability to
be flexible. The idea of modularity is defined and used by
the author as independent modules that focus on one task and
are minimally connected to the other modules. With
modularity, the author has allowed for the possibility of a
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pooled interdependence, that is, the modules share a common
data base or resource. The intent here is not to imply that
the units should operate autonomously. Instead, it is more
efficient when the units operate together as a well
coordinated system.
b. Connectivity
Connectivity is defined as communication resources
connecting nodes. It is characterized by information content,
type of media, and essential performance criteria. It will
consist of links, gateways, and networks. When working with
two or more elements, this capability of the architecture
provides essential communications services, between battle
force entities, with a minimal amount of exploitable
electronic exposure.
c. Simplicity
It is easy to say that the simplest architecture
that works is the most desirable. For this thesis, simplicity
will be defined as the clear, uncomplicated structure that can
be employed by the resources and still accomplish all of the
tasks. In real life, however, this is normally hard to
achieve. Simplicity must be retained throughout
implementation, use, modification, expansion, and
reconfiguration of the entire force system. A system must be
simple at the highest level, or it can not be expected to




Although this thesis does not delve into the
acquisition process for the individual systems, the
architecture must allow the achievement of the required battle
force performance, as derived from the Top Level Warfare
Requirement, within projected resource constraints. Economy,
as seen by the author, is the process of acquiring the system
through the most cost effective method, all the while meeting
the Top Level System Requirements. These constraints are not
limited to dollars, but also include manpower and raw material
resources as well.
e Correspondence
Correspondence in an architecture is defined, for
the purposes of this thesis, to allow resources at each level
to have the ability to communicate with other resources at
every level. The system structure must be in accordance with
the steady state functional responsibilities of the user
command structure. As such, it must be complete in its
correspondence to all levels within the system, including
those compartmented by security. In addition, the multi-
national arena must be aware of the language base that would
be necessary for understanding each command.
f. Continuity
To ensure all entities are following the same
concept of operations, there must be continuity of information
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across battle force elements. Continuity, as used here, means
essentially that entities use the same "rule book" to govern
their operation. This allows for similar procedures to be
used in similar circumstances, and also standardizes data
presentation. This is basically so that any appropriate
combination of information presented to a decision-maker, at
any level in the system, is consistent with that information
presented to another decision-maker somewhere else in the
system.
g. Layering
The system must allow for a hierarchial
disposition of command structure. Layering, defined for this
thesis as the ability to follow a chain of command, permits
this to happen. Layering thus allows the command structure to
accomondate both primary and alternative mission areas in
coordinated and autonomous modes of operation. Functions must
be allocated so that there are multiple ways to achieve the
equivalent result. Networking functions, in this layered
method, allows retention of unity of command, and the
flexibility to adapt to changes in the threat.
h. Sustainability
Sustainability is defined as the capability of
military forces, units, weapons systems, equipments, and
personnel to operate at a specified level of mission activity
for a period of time. The key word inherent in this
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definition is survive. The system must be able to sustain
itself through all kinds of obstacles. To do this, the system
must be in a high state of readiness, achieved through
embedded self-test, on-line training, physical protection, and
logistics support.
i . Compatibility
Most of the other principles of an architecture
are generic, and can operate regardless of the nationality of
the entities involved. Compatibility, however, requires that
changes or additions to the battle force must be
constructively operational with existing systems.
Compatibility is the capability of two or more items or
components of equipment or material to exist or function in
the same system or environment without mutual interference.
In a "come-as-you-are" coalition crisis situation, this could
be tough; necessitating the need for common joining doctrine
that would allow for fluid command and control force posture.
(Wiersma, 1987)
B. CURRENT COMMAND AND CONTROL ARCHITECTURE
The primary fighting unit of the Navy is the multiple-ship
carrier battle group. The collection of the units which
comprise the force cannot remain rigid, as seen in the
principles of an architecture discussed earlier. By sorting
the units by element composition and warfare tasks, the force
can be broken down into even smaller groups. An example of
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this is the sorting of resources with anti-surface warfare
capabilities in a different category than anti-submarine
capable resources. This allows for a distinct pairing of
resource to warfare area.
Warfare mission areas are broken down into two distinct
groups, primary and supporting tasks. By dividing the warfare
missions into these two groups, a logical division of
resources takes place. The warfare areas have already been
defined for our purposes. Defined primary warfare mission
areas include Anti-Air Warfare, Anti-Surface Warfare, Anti-
submarine Warfare, Strike Warfare, and Space and Electronic
Warfare. Defined support areas are Command, Control, and
Communications, Intelligence, and battle force logistics.
These warfare areas, by definition, are those areas
responsible for a specific major phase or portion of naval
warfare. Support mission areas provide sustenance across the
boundaries of the primary warfare areas, and are not contained
by one aspect of warfare. (Curtis, 1989, pp. 14-18)
C. LIABILITIES IN THE EXISTING ARCHITECTURE
There are areas, as might be expected, in the current
architecture where capabilities are greater than needed to
counter the existing threat, as well as areas where the
architecture just does not measure up. Curtis (p. 19) calls
these areas overlaps and shortfalls. The most important
lesson from the history of naval warfare is not that better
34
technology prevails, but rather, the lesson learned is more
direct - those who use technology better or he who can deny
the other technology on which he depends, prevails.
(Copernicus, 1991, p. 2-2)
1. Flexibility of the doctrine to the threat
"Flexibility of the current architecture to include
the changing technology of weapon and command and control
systems," states Copernicus (p. 2-8), "is the first of many
functional shortfalls to the existing system." The problem is
simple. The navy is trying to absorb the current threat into
a doctrine that was established for a threat perceived some
time ago. In fact, although the Composite Warfare Commander
concept has undergone some minor changes since its conception,
its focus has remained the same for the last forty years
(Copernicus, 1991, p. 2-8) . The world, and specifically the
threat, has changed. In the post-Cold War era, Contingency
and Low Objective Warfare (CALOW) threats will be diverse,
task force elements will be both joint and allied, and the
ends and means of each mission may be different.
Technological advances may mean rapid, radical shifts of
structured elements to various parts of the world, and it is
from this point that the command and control architecture




Traffic separation between administration and
operations in an increased operational tempo is difficult at
best. Todays system does not allow the decision-maker to sort
operational traffic from administrative traffic. This means
that when the Navy goes to war, there are very few procedures
to gain capacity to support the increased operational tempo.
At its best, the Navy sets up a message screening board or
imposes worldwide Minimize. The lack of traffic separation
has been observed in most major exercises, as well as in
Desert Storm. (Copernicus, 1991, pp. 2/8-10) The ability to
decant different forms of traffic will be essential for the
decision-maker of the future.
3. Message Format and Form
The information available is currently conveyed in a
narrative format, in the form of paper. Message format style
has been changed and the resulting effect is to cut down on
the verbiage, but the paper copy is still prevalent. In
consequence, the navy is communicating in a pre-television
age. The communication channels in Desert Storm were
practically the same type used in the North African campaigns
fifty years ago; that is, they were narrative in nature.
(Copernicus, 1991, p. 2-9) A practical example of this is the
paperwork that surrounds an underway replenishment. When
operating in the Mediterranean, a ship has to send a message
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back to the beach in order to get the supply ship who is only
2 000 yards away to give them supplies.
A decision-maker currently has to read the equivalent
of all the editions of the New York Times in order to get all
the information he needs, everyday. Then, he must remember
what he saw on page 6, paragraph 15, line 4, and associate it
with information gathered in other sections of the paper.
This association is very important, simply because the
originators of the traffic do not reside in the same building,
and often have different views on the subject. (Copernicus,
1991, p 2-9)
4. System Inadequacies
Because the current system is so overwhelmed by
narrative traffic and the diversity of sensors inputing
information into the system, the procedures to control the
traffic, as well as the equipment needed to send the traffic,
are not efficient. All the traffic sent to the commander,
will be received by the commander; however, operational
traffic does not have a higher priority in the current system
over administrative traffic, especially when both types of
messages have the same category (i.e. flash, priority,
routine) . The traffic the satellite sends to the tactical
commander is less a conscious operational decision, then an




There are several factors that come to mind when
discussing traffic overload - the narrative format of the
message, the lack of common display, navigational differences,
a wide range of computer equipment and operating styles, and
staff compromises. All of these factors influence the
decision-maker via a variety of channels, and lead to a loss
of operational perspective. Architecturally and
operationally, the goal must be, according to Copernicus:
"one emission sensed leads to one location report over one
communications path to sea at one time"
(Copernicus, 1991, p 2-10)
Communications loading should reflect the enemy's actions, our
actions, and the system that reports to us. While the
decision-maker cannot always control the enemy's actions, and
it is not desirable to limit the second, the decision-maker
can bring efficiencies to the third.
6. Threat Flexibility
In the post-Cold War analogy, the "big red machine"
has apparently dissolved. With the Soviet collapse, the
requirement to disseminate information about a host of other
possible threats grew. This challenge goes beyond the wide-
area, non-organic sensors, as well as data fusion, and
addresses the following problem:
• Where is the threat?
• Who is an ally?
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• What are the ally and threat intentions?
It is apparent, therefore, that the intelligence system is no
longer just Navy, but also includes Government agencies,
possibly multinational corporations, and news services. The
world has become a diverse place with no real perceived enemy.
The intelligence infrastructure must be powerful, flexible,
and able to reach out for information quickly.
7. Information Display
It is interesting that this is a shortfall in our own
system, when it is also an obstacle in the multi-national
arena. The system must be able to display data more
effectively and more efficiently, incorporating data file
transfers into day to day operations. Eventually, these data
file transfers, along with the associated image, must replace
the message as the principle operational format. (Copernicus,
1991, pp. 2/1-12)
D. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE SYSTEM
There are two architectures that were developed
simultaneously that address the shortfalls listed above.
Copernicus, which has been adopted by the Navy and stresses an
operator viewpoint at all levels, and the Navy Cooperative
Engagement Architecture, which looks at the warfare missions
to be conducted and the resources available for the mission.
Both have the ability to be implemented by the Navy, if for no
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other reason than to rid the service of "stove pipe" systems
in both the joint and combined arenas.
1. Copernicus
The Copernicus Architecture is both a new C*I
architecture to replace our current system and an investment
strategy that provides a programmatic basis to construct it
over the next decade. The pillars of Copernicus are operated
at the following force levels:
• The watchstander : The watchstander is supported through
the employment of generic high-technology workstations,
dif ferentiable only by separate warfare software packages.
• The Navy Composite Warfare Commander: The CWC is
supported through the employment of a series of virtual
Tactical Data Information Exchange Systems (TADIXS) . The
number, nature, and structure are flexible, and are up to
the decision-makers concept.
• The Joint Task Force Commander: This decision-maker will
be supported through the TADIXS-GLOBIXS (Global
Information Exchange System) exchange system. The key
element to remember about this level is the amount of
CALOW situations that occur, and that the on-scene
commander will generally become this levels Copernicus
node.
• The Shore Commander: The primary way this operator is
supported is through GLOBIXS. The development of this
high-technology command connectivity allows video, voice,
data, and narrative to be passed to all echelons, across
all services, to all allies, and across the spectrum of
warfare (Copernicus, 1991, pp. 3/6-7)
.
It is an interactive framework of four pillars, which tie
together the command and control process of the Composite
Warfare Commander afloat, the Joint Task Force Commander and
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the CINCs ashore, all the while supporting the "operator" at
those four levels.
a. Global Information Exchange System (GLOBIXS)
The first pillar of the Copernicus Architecture
consists of the GLOBIXS, the shore nets. The GLOBIXS will be
a series of virtual sensor and analytic Defense Communication
System (DCS) nets that will provide information management and
information concentration, by acting as the shore gateways for
specific reports to sea. GLOBIXS thus are constructed a
little bit like interstate highways; they are limited-access,
high-speed, thoroughfares. Additionally, GLOBIXS have
connections among each other so that traffic may be diverted
across several systems, as well as to the operating forces
through a consolidated CINC Command Complex (CCC) , the second
pillar of the architecture. The GLOBIXS will, in effect,
orbit around the second pillar. (Copernicus, 1991, pp. 4/1-12)
In today's architecture, roughly 3 3,000 commands
ashore can send messages to sea at the whim and timing of the
sender, not the receiver. The receiver (the operator) is thus
inundated and robbed of critical communications capacity.
Once Copernicus is in place, GLOBIXS, intersected and managed
through the CCC, will form a limited-access information system
with an operator who will have the capability to configure the
requirements, not the sender. (Copernicus, 1991, pp. 4/12-23)
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b. CINC Command Center (CCC)
The second pillar of the architecture serves as a
gateway for communications to the Tactical Command Centers
(TCCs) . The CCC as envisioned in Copernicus, would include a
number of existing organizations brought together
technologically by common workstations and a common Local Area
Network. The primary difference between GLOBIXS and CCC is
that GLOBIXS is a horizontal aggregation of communities with
common interests, while CCCs are vertical infrastructures.
This capability will allow the system to restructure itself in
the future. The actual physical structure of the CCC consists
of six organizational building blocks:
(1) The Fleet Command Center (FCC)
(2) The Operations Watch Center, the heart of the
architecture ashore
(3) The SEW center
(4) The Research Center
(5) The Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) , consisting of
the Fleet Intelligence Center, the Fleet Ocean
Surveillance Information Center, and the Cryptologic
Support Group
(6) The Theater ASW Center (Copernicus, 1991, pp. 5/1-14)
Undoubtedly, each CCC will be configured differently. This is
welcome, however, because the system must be able to adapt to
the commanders view, given the perceived threat.
42
c. Tactical Data Information Exchange System
(TADIXS)
The CCC will share information with the Tactical
Command Center (TCC) , through a series of Tactical Data
Information Exchange Systems. As per the doctrine of the
Copernicus Architecture, the TADIXS nets are not physical but
logical nets, established at the request and mix desired by
the tactical commander. They are not to be considered as
actual data bits of communications, but rather as functional
subsets of operational, support, and sensor information that
would be accomondated over dynamically managed communications
pathways. The major immediate impact of TADIXS will be to
eliminate the narrative format of the Navy operational
message, instead moving towards binary data rates that could
pass information as high resolution graphics and imagery.
Also, like GLOBIXS, TADIXS will be virtual, allowing the CWC
the flexibility to select the information which would best
augment his command - sort of a command and control "his way"
button. As stated earlier, one CWC's configuration might
differ from another, even in the same theater; yet, it is this
operational flexibility that is the heart of Copernicus, and
is what will maintain its high rate of sustainability and
survivability once implemented in the fleet.
TADIXS, Copernicus style, might be confused with
the existing TADIXS A and the planned TADIXS B. Although the
technical detail of Copernicus TADIXS is beyond the scope of
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this thesis, there are four broad categories. First and
foremost is the command and control of tactical battle forces.
This command TADIXS is envisioned as multi-format, including
video-teleconferencing. Second to Command TADIXS is Support
TADIXS. In this category is the only form of TADIXS which has
a narrative message pathway, that being NAVIXS. Direct
Targeting TADIXS and Force Operations TADIXS complete the
final two categories. (Copernicus, 1991, pp. 6/1-15)
d. The Tactical Command Center (TCC)
The fourth and final pillar of the Copernicus
Architecture, this pillar uses the Tactical Command Center
(TCC) to signify the actual Combat Information Centers of the
tactical commander and his units. The TCC provides tactical
displays, integrated information management, and accessibility
to tactical communications to support Navy warfighting
missions. In this section is also the required battle
connectivity to unit, other force commanders, and the CCC.
Seen another way, the TCC operates very similarly to the CCC.
Both share a tactical picture, and connect the Navy to the
Services and to allies, at the tactical as well as theater
level. To achieve this interconnectivity, Local Area Networks
will be established. Until multi-level security is achieved,
the Special Intelligence and General Service traffic will have
to be carried on separate LANs. (Copernicus, 1991, pp. 7/1-10)
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2 . Navy Cooperative Engagement Architecture
Developed concurrently to the Copernicus concept, the
cooperative engagement initiative is an attempt to overcome
stand-alone sensor and weapon system limitations, especially
when targets employ motion profiles and multi-spectral stealth
measures of signature control. Moreover, changing
technologies and emerging third-world capabilities present
reduced response times, implying the need for a realtime
surveillance and response capability available to the force at
all times. To understand from what baseline the term
"cooperative engagement" is being used, the following
definition and purpose are stated.
A warf ighting capability designed to more adequately meet
and defeat the threat, through the synergistic integration
of distributed resources among two or more units. Its
purpose will be to fight the force as an entity.
(Cooperative Engagement, 1991, p. 19)
The cooperative engagement effort focused on the problem












Size of the fighting force
Level of Architectural detail
Performance assessment (Cooperative Engagement, 1991,
pp. 4-6)
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In the broadest sense, a conventional engagement is
limited to resources available on the engaging platform.
Engagement range is constrained as is depth of fire,
firepower, and sensors. Cooperative Engagement used the basic
functions of detect, control, and engage, and showed that the
control and engage function are almost always accomplished by
the shooter. If it were possible to share these functions
among other platforms in the force, advocates the Cooperative
Engagement Initiative, the constraints could be lifted. To
accomplish this primary goal, the key elements were as
follows:
• Fight the force as a whole
• Implement the full range of functionality available on one
platform across multiple platforms
• Provide force level management
• Maximize force effectiveness through multi-dimensional and
multi-source sensing
• Decentralize the process so that one loss does not negate
the ability of the force to accomplish the mission
• Provide end-to-data communications from sensor to weapon
(Cooperative Engagement, 1991, p. ES-3)
Cooperative Engagement becomes the structure for the ideas of
the Copernicus Architecture. By using the operator concept to
fight the force as a whole, the decision-maker has
decentralized his forces, and maintained the survivability and
flexibility of the multi-national force.
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3. Issues for Discussion
The items for discussion include the functional
requirements, the physical hardware, and the organizational




The functions are what a user does. To perform
these functions, a user generates commands, which are normally
requests for system services which go to the next lower layer,
provided the architecture used promotes a layered approach.
For both Copernicus and Cooperative Engagement, the layered
approach is used. Within those systems, force level
management, detection, command and control, and engagements
are all requests that are formulated up or down the layered
hierarchial approach. The big difference between the two
systems actually appears to be on the focus. Copernicus
focuses on the individual operator and the communication links
that support the operator, while Cooperative Engagement widens
the view somewhat to include battle force structure.
b. Physical
The configurations and components of Copernicus
and Cooperative Engagement, have been listed earlier. The
architectural characteristics of each can be compared and
contrasted in order to develop the ground work for the multi-
national architecture to be laid out in the following
chapters.
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Each design implemented a layered approach that
gave a high degree of modularity. As seen from the principles
of an architecture, this capability, coupled with the idea
that an individual layer can develop at different rates,
allows for the flexibility needed in a combined theater.
To continue on with flexibility, both allow for
interchangeable parts such as displays, workstations,
processors, and memory modules. The Copernicus concept of
identical workstations for the operator only being changed by
the software generation/re-generation concept is exceptionally
appealing to this author, an experienced console operator.
This is appealing because of the learning curve that is
required for each console now in operation in the fleet. If
there was a base console that operated different warfare areas
with only an exchange of software, the job would be different,
but the physical operation of the console would be the same,
allowing for a concentration on warfare tactics. Such a
concentration on tactics would be possible, because the
operation of the console would soon become stored habitual
behavior, not unlike driving a manual transmission car.
Similarly, standard formats, protocols, interfaces and links
allow for both internal (what Copernicus has started working
on) , and external (joint/allied) compatibility.
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c. Organizational
After reviewing the components of both
architectures, the organizational hierarchy was evident in the
principles that both systems used. For a further discussion
on the organizational structure of either architecture, see
Copernicus Architecture Phase I: Requirements Definition,
August 1991, or the Navy Cooperative Engagement Architecture
Working Group Final Report, June 1991.
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IV. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
"Authority without wisdom is like a heavy ax without an
edge, fitter to bruise than polish"
- Anne Bradstreet
A. PROBLEM ANALYSIS
The key element in discussing the paradigm used for
problem analysis is the inherent fact that it does not really
matter who's system you use, or for that matter, who uses the
system. When this author viewed the internal structure of
Command and Control used by the United States Navy, analyzing
the information and data flows, the Stimulus-Hypothesis-
Option-Response (SHOR) model was the base for problem solving.
This model was chosen because of the author's concept of the
problem.
Cooperative Engagement is a structure that allows the
individual operator in the Copernicus Architecture to approach
problems utilizing the SHOR paradigm. The SHOR paradigm was
chosen for the operators decision making model, because of its
ability to deal explicitly with both information input
uncertainty, and consequence-of-action uncertainty in military
problem solving. (Waltz and Buede, 1986, pp. 396-410) To
illustrate, using the three major concepts listed above, a
discussion on objects and their relationships to other objects
will be presented, after an overview of the SHOR paradigm.
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Both will be essential, as the entity relationships and the
SHOR paradigm then lead to a discussion on how the decision-
maker solves resource allocation problems in the Cooperative
Engagement structure.
1. SHOR Paradigm
Wohl introduced the SHOR paradigm as a model to
illustrate the perceptible features of the military decision-
making process (Wohl, 1984, pp. 261-307). As stated earlier,
the model was devised explicitly to deal with the information
input uncertainty and consequence-of-action uncertainty in
military problem solving. It revolves around the data driven
reactive approach to problem solving. This then leads to the
concept that the model is tactical in nature, dealing with the
unpredictable elements and urgency of combat. But the SHOR
paradigm itself does not fully allow the flexibilities that a
commander might need in the realm of battle. To accomplish
this, the idea of a mental framework was added to the picture.
Besides providing the decision maker with an internal
representation of the problem, the ability to compare to past
experiences, a mental model functions as a theory or framework
from which to generate hypotheses. This, concludes Wohl,
affirms that the hypothesis is directly contrived from the
interaction of input information with a commander's mental









FIGURE 4.1: SHOR MODEL OF DECISION MAKING
SOURCE; DATA FUSION AND DECISION SUPPORT FOR COMUAND AND CONTROL
In addition to the loops presented in the discussion on the
model, Figure 4.1 also adds an additional feedback loop to the
model. This then gives the model the ability of the
hypothesis process to query the data fusion process to search
for data that may support hypotheses under consideration.
Another key aspect to the SHOR paradigm is the ability
to incorporate the psychological concepts of cognitive bias
and attitude of the decision maker. This can and will come
into play quite often, when discussing the interaction of the
impromptu coalition, that may or may not be given the time to
train on a coordinated doctrine. Attitudes have a direct
impact on the desired outcome, as well as an indirect impact
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on the course-of-action options availability and selection.
Cognitive bias also affect the decision, assigning weights to
both the hypothesis and the options available.
2. Object Orientation
The SHOR paradigm gave a model for baseline decision
making. When deciding the elements used in the model it is
best to determine the actual structure in a object-oriented
systems analysis. From here, it can be shown that the
information and data flows required from a certain system can
be broken down into certain specific objects, thus allowing a
detailed analysis of the structure, without getting in the
nuts and bolts of the individual components. Yet, to do this,
it is imperative that object-oriented analysis is understood
to a certain level. This can be tedious at times, so bear
with me.
The world is full of things; different types of
animals, cars, sports, planes, and ships might come to mind.
For object-orientation, lump these like objects of each
category together and call the resulting abstraction an
object. This is done so that all of the real-world objects in
the set have the same characteristics and are subject to and
conform to the same set of rules. Of course, depending on the
decision makers criteria and rules, likeness depends entirely
on the purposes the decision-maker has in mind. For our
purposes, we will identify Command and Control nodes, ship
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bridges (the Officer of the Deck for navigational reasons)
,
and communication paths as our objects.
To further the objects orientation, the empty objects
can be represented together in a table, and the table can be
filled in to represent the real-world things from which the
abstracted object originated. To identify a single
characteristic possessed by all the entities that were,
themselves, abstracted as an object, in itself defines an
attribute. To better understand this concept is to view a
ship as an entity. On each ship there is the ability to
communicate on communication lines illustrated earlier. These
communication lines would be an attribute of each entity ship.
The place that objects, tables, and attributes is leading us
to is one of relationships. This is critical to understanding
the structure of a command and control system.
The concept of a relationship is easy to grasp, and is
used in determining how entities fit together by way of an
entity-relationship diagram. Simply put, a relationship is
the abstraction that holds together certain objects. For our
use, each type of relationship will not be explored, but
rather defined simply as a ship contains command and control
nodes, a ship contains communication nets, and a command and
control node works on communication nets. Further
illustrations of the higher order entity-relationships are
included in Shlaer and Mellor. (Shlaer and Mellor, 1988)
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B. INFORMATION AND DATA FLOWS
Now that the analyst has a paradigm to understand the
authors decision-maker at any level of the architecture, as
well as a object based system to work in, where does the
information come from?
A major concern in any information system is with
information flow. Individuals and organizations, through
roles in the command structure, generate and receive system
information. Paths taken by this information flow are related
to command structure but usually include additional
connections. The information-flow structure per se represents
the where and what aspects of system information flow. To
establish, then, the information flows that are necessary in
a Command and Control architecture, the following data must be
established for each information path:
• Nature of required communications - voice or data (data
flows will be discussed shortly)
• Frequency - average, minimum, maximum, if not continuous -
and duration of communications
• Fraction of calls initiated by each node
• Acceptable delay statistics due to busy nodes or
unavailable paths, not applicable to a node-switching
network
• Priority of information transfer
Data flows are described by the following characteristics:
• Synchronous or asynchronous
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• Bit-rate
• One-way or two-way
• With or without error detection, with correction or
retransmission
The completeness of the characterization of information and
data flows are related to the individual Command and Control
Architecture by the following three requirements:
(1) how specific the requirements are, or how well the
existing system is understood
(2) how critical the system is for meeting the special and
urgent needs of its users, and
(3) how much money and time are available
(Beam, 1989, pp. 152-157)
C. TIME CONSTRAINED FUNCTIONS
In developing the need for time constrained functions, the
author initially looked at the concept of petri nets. By
design of the thesis, the actual description of the command
process using petri nets was not conducted. In its place, the
command functions that are required for a Command and Control
Architecture are listed and discussed in the object-
orientation view, and within the SHOR paradigm presented
earlier. It should be noted that these functions are being
discussed under the time constrained heading, because of the
inherent need for multi-national forces to have the capability
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to organize quickly and efficiently in order to complete a
mission.
1. Observe
Within the broad term of "Observe", a wide variety of
functions preside. It is an all-encompassing data fusion
function. It involves not only storing data together, but
also association, correlation, and tracking functions. Quite
often, this aggregate of information is referred to as the
tactical picture at the combat level. Within the SHOR
paradigm, the observe function falls under the Hypothesis or
Monitor domain. This allows a combination of the sensory
inputs to build a perception of the location and activity of
any and all objects in the environment. This perception may
be colored by expectations arising from current knowledge, or
of past behavior of the entities involved. It may even be
biased by the current tactical environment.
a. Generate the tactical picture
The current tactical situation is determined by
integrating the position and movement of own force and enemy
units from all-source sensor information. It is this function
that takes all the observed contacts, associated
relationships, and attributes, finally generating the best
level of knowledge concerning all contacts of interest. The
goal is to provide an estimate with a corresponding confidence
level, for the entire force to comprehend. Because of the
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probability of a less than 100 percent coverage, it is not
uncommon to carry more than one hypothesis of the situation,
pending new information. Additionally, the current and
projected environmental picture is developed.
b. Maintain data
Maintaining a data base is perhaps the easiest of
the command functions to understand, but still one of the
hardest to consistently work on. This function is the product
of the incoming sensor and message data, and historical
records. It is required to maintain the historical and real-
time/near real-time tactical picture data base. This data
base should be tested on a regular basis to ensure that the
data base consistency is maintained. A real world example of
this function is the Force Over the Horizon Coordinator
(FOTC) . To ensure that a viable target data base on contacts
of interest is kept up to date, the battlegroup commander
designates a resource to keep track of data entries. The
concept is simple, but due to lack of sensor coverage, non-
autonomous position reports, and variability in navigational
systems, the task becomes monumental, and requires constant
attention.
c. Characterize data
After generating the tactical picture with the
sensor information available and updating the data base, the
data must be characterized. The decision-maker must be able
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to sort the individual events taking place, and in as many
cases as possible associate the events with known actions and
responses stored in a historical schema. Again, this process
is described with a confidence level. Following sorting and
association, the events must be identified and mapped onto a
resource. Before the event can be partitioned to a resource,
however, the resources must be compiled and their readiness
condition known by the decision-maker. The reason is by
monitoring the configuration and readiness of available
resources, required actions can be directed and performed
within the limitations, allowing corrective actions to take




The assess function takes the combined data gathered
in the Observe function and gives meaning to the tactical
situation, including enemy intent, and potential outcomes of
unfolding events. Within the SHOR paradigm, the Assess
function also is located in the hypothesis stage, and infers
meaning from the observation. This is a situation assessment
and hypotheses involve both current situations and anticipated
future outcomes.
a. Conduct mission assessment
When the mission or an intermediate objective has
been accomplished, suspended, or aborted, mission assessment
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is performed. This involves an assessment of goals and
objectives that were met, reconstruction of events and lessons
learned that may be of value in future missions or
engagements. During the physical operation, this constitutes
a progress report to a higher authority.
b. Assess plan effectiveness
The effectiveness assessment is used to assess
bounds, develop options, and provide conflict resolution and
identify risks in the current plan. The assessment may result
in the realization that the current plan, including its
contingencies, is not adequate to accomplish the mission and
that a new plan or strategy is required. If a new update is
required, then the execution process may be inhibited and a
replan in necessary. It is here the anticipation is developed
to avoid blindly following a plan that is no longer likely to
succeed. Assess, as a function, operates with the Observe
function in the evolution of prediction. When the Assess
function needs to conjecture future situations, it will advise
the Observe function what assumptions to make in order to
predict the future tactical picture. From this relationship,
the decision-maker will develop alternative courses-of-action.
The decision-maker will also identify uncertainties in the
incoming data (hence the SHOR paradigm) , determine adequacy of
resources and data, and finally predict the outcome with a
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confidence level, comparing this product with the desired
result.
c. Assess plan progress
By using this command function, a decision-maker
has the ability to evaluate progress along the plan in order
to support the decision to execute a desired act in accordance
with the mission priorities. This is done by comparing the
known tactical situation with a set of conditions used to
determine if the plan is being executed toward the expected
sequence of events and therefore the expected outcome. As
long as the plan is on target, this function just assures that
the progress and resulting small branching decisions made are
in conjunction with the overall goal. If the plan is not on
target, the decision-maker must then determine if the
contingency criteria has been met, and if it has, execute a
contingency plan.
d. Characterize the current situation
Based on the raw data received by the entity in
the observe function, the idea here is to extract the
meaningful data in terms of capabilities, advantages, and
intentions of all contacts of interest within the tactical
picture. From this compilation of data, several hypotheses
can then be generated. Evidence to support or reject each
hypothesis is then sought from further data collected through
sensors in the observe function. If the decision-maker has
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received good data and made sound decisions, even without 100
percent coverage each hypothesis may exist with varying
degrees of confidence, risk, and payoff. Most important in
the international arena, is the characterization of own-force
and enemy posture. Each posture involves an evaluation of
tactics and operational effectiveness, the state of
operational capability and readiness, intentions, and the
vulnerabilities of each force.
3. Plan
Within this function the commander generates the
optional courses-of-action intended to achieve the goal or
mission. It evaluates and selects primary and contingency
courses-of-action, including organizational responsibility,
procedures and allocation of resources to general task areas.
The criteria for assessing situations and changing procedures
are defined in this function, and they are actually
implemented in the assess function. The procedures, including
the rules for allocating resources, are used in the execute
function, solely to implement the plan of action and control
its progress. Within the SHOR paradigm, the decision-maker is
now in the Option phase. The plan function contains the
option generation and evaluation processes. The selection of
options is a decision that can possibly result in contingency
plans that become deferred decisions or preplanned courses-of-
action. Also, the plan function has a subfunction that allows
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the generation of plans and directives that are products of
the process. This is part of the Response function in the
SHOR paradigm.
Planning is the establishment of control procedures
for the accomplishment of a purpose. To be able to
accomondate the variety of multi-national coalitions that
could spring up at any given time, this entire thesis is one
such planning document. To operate in a "come-as-you-are"
environment and yet still be extremely flexible, without a
giant loss of efficiency, requires such an effective control
procedure. Thus, planning generates the pattern for desired
behavior of the forces or elements to be controlled in
response to future events caused by one's own or others'
actions. Several alternatives may actually be developed, but
only one chosen as the plan of action, even though it too may
have several contingency branches which anticipate uncertainty
in multiple future events.
a. Define and Bound the mission
As the first step in the planning
function/process, this function bounds the problem to be
solved by putting limits on the problem and the options for
consideration in solving the problem. It is in this function
that higher order directives are received and interpreted,
within the framework of the operation, the higher authority's
mission and the capabilities and limitations of assigned
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resources. This function becomes easier when tackled in the
object-oriented framework discussed, but even with this black
box method, the attitude and cognitive bias of the decision-
maker is extremely important. By starting in this area, one
can easily define specific goals and objectives, and this also
characterizes the generally expected unfolding of the tactical
situation. It is only constrained by established procedures
and rules of engagement set by higher authority. This was not
often a problem working in a single component or even joint
arena, but when working with other nationalities, it is
imperative that a common ground be reached in rules of
engagement. This will be amplified in chapter five. In
summary, when defining mission bound, the decision-maker must
receive all incoming data objectively, develop a mission
statement, describe the geographical area of operations,
describe own and enemy forces, and postulate enemy strengths
and possible courses-of-action.
Jb. Development of alternative courses-of-action
By combining the characterization of the current
situation with the mission definition described in the plan
bounds, proposed course-of-action and alternatives are
developed. In this process, additional information or
guidance may be requested from the higher command authority,
when proposed options appear to go beyond the bounds
developed. This process involves the delineation of
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procedures and nominal identification of organic and non-
organic resource requirements for each proposed option.
Within each option, a more specific characterization of the
expected situation is derived in terms of the proposed
activity, operating procedures, and enemy responses
anticipated for that approach. For each option, an evaluation
of the potential outcome, based upon an identified
effectiveness criteria, risks, and benefits will be required.
Even with the list of basic functions that must be
done to efficiently handle a warfare area in a battle force
listed later in Chapter five, contingency planning will be
crucial. In an ideal world, the commander could request what
kind of platforms he/she needed to accomplish mission goals.
Reality dictates otherwise. Instead of asking for certain
platforms from allied nations to "round out" the battle force,
it will be necessary to accomondate forces available. With
these available resources, the commander must then complete
the assigned mission from higher authority. This then
necessitates the need for contingency plans to best mold the
resources available. In the event of the necessity to perform
a replanning process, new alternatives may need to be
generated, or earlier options updated with more recent
information or direction. For each course-of-action it is
necessary to ensure that an organizational as well as command
structure is established. From these structures missions and
task objectives are then delegated to subordinates. Resource
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activities, to include time, place, and tactics involved,
operating procedures must both also be proposed and
solidified, if for no other reason than conservation of
resources. Operating in a coordinated plane is difficult
without standard operating procedures, tactics and rules of
engagement.
c. Select plan of action
The overall goal of this command function is to
identify risks and shortfalls of each course-of-action, and
then select the primary and contingency courses-of-action. It
is a classical decision. The process involves a review of the
potential outcomes of each alternative with
advantages/disadvantages, suitability, feasibility, and
acceptability. With each is also an estimation of the
probability of success and the risks associated with each
alternative, as stated above. Within this function is also
the replanning and update process, when in the assessment
function it is determined that the latest plan can not be met.
A contingency plan may go into effect at this point, requiring
a cessation of some tasks being executed. Almost in
afterthought, the results of replanning then becomes the
standard to gauge the plans success against.
d. Plan generation with required updates
Given time and sufficient manpower, this function
ensures, to the best of our ability, that a plan goes
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according to schedule; thus, laying the framework for mission
accomplishment. In a multi-national coalition hastily formed
in a crisis prevention mode, this may not get the attention it
deserves. Specifically, the generation of the original plan
and associated updates involves the elaboration of the detail
required to clearly and concisely communicate the expected
objectives, schedule of events and methods of achieving them,
to other elements of the organization including subordinates,
support elements and superiors. Elements of the plan would
definitely include intended movement, support, protection,
coordination, and other methods of control of the assigned
resources.
The plan also identifies a set of conditions that
describe the expected situation and the criteria for
identifying situations. These criteria are used in the
assessment function to determine plan progress, and for the
interpretation of the meaning and intent of the future
situation. These criteria must be in the mutually exclusive
category, otherwise replanning is inevitable. The formulation
of the plan may involve the dissemination of a preliminary
operational plan/directive to subordinates. Then, after
coordinating with these subordinates, force posture is
evaluated, and the final plan is generated. Some critical
elements of a finalized plan will include the following; a
developed concept of operations, specific contingency
situations and responses, and delegated authority.
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4 . Execute
The climax of an operation, the execute function
selects a specific course-of-action, based on the current
assessment of the situation. Using procedures established in
the plan and data gathered in the observe function, specific
allocation of resources and tasks or even specific guidance
variables are generated as directives and issued as orders or
implemented as actions. It is the resource allocation
directive that represents the outcome of the decision making
process, and essentially what the author is doing in chapter
five. The SHOR paradigm involves the execute function
primarily in the Option phase, but like the plan function,
also has a subfunction that is driven by the Response phase of
SHOR.
a. Identify current courses-of-action
The execute function provides the processes that
define and describe the specific actions to be effected in
order to carry out the prescribed plan of action. The first
sub-function in execute, identifying current courses-of-action
is based on the assessment of the current situation, selecting
from a predefined set of contingencies. If a condition arises
where a contingency has not been formulated for, the decision-
maker must fall back to the planning function and replan the
situation. This process involves the determination of the
specific tactical and support reguirements based on the action
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requirement of this contingency or branch. It also
establishes rules for scheduling resources, identifies data
requirements for control generation, and provides criteria for
threshold settings.
b. Schedule resources
A major task when operating in the combined arena,
the author has decided to use the mapper algorithm developed
by Alphatech, Inc. to map functions to available resources.
The functions to be mapped are related to the specific branch
of the latest plan. The mapping process involves matching the
task requirements to the capabilities of the available
resources. Only after this is accomplished are specific
commands generated for the implementation of the tasks at
hand.
c. Generate commands
The tangible function that most people can relate
to, this function encompasses such things as a direct change
in status or posture, a transformation of data for control
purposes, and the physical documentation of command
directives. Another way of viewing this function would be as
the real time equivalent of plan generation. Here is where
such things as equipment settings, sensor operation and
platform positioning are specified to optimize performance
under the existing environmental conditions and tactical
situation.
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V. GENERIC MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE ARCHITECTURE
Doctrine unites action. It influences and is influenced
by training, technology, tactics, and objectives.
Doctrine, the instituted set of procedures for combat,
should be compiled for the people controlling the weapons
systems, ships and aircraft, elements of the fleet, and
the fleet as a whole. These procedures must be
compatible. Doctrine at all levels should be specific,
designed to achieve the best results from a united team,
but should also allow room for inspired tactics and
initiative.
- Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Capt. USN (Ret.)
A. SUMMARY OF INFORMATION AND DATA FLOWS
Utilizing the SHOR paradigm as a tool for the decision-
maker allowed the Copernicus architecture, with its emphasis
on the operator and the communication nodes that input to the
operator, to fuse with the Cooperative Engagement structure of
resources. Operating with these tools, the author developed
a generic tactical picture, complete with characterized,
maintained data on resource status and condition. In the
observation phase, the tactical picture presented to the
decision-maker went through an assessment function. This
allowed the decision-maker to conduct mission assessment by
evaluating plan effectiveness and plan progress. Plan
assessment required that an output of the planning function
become an input to the assessment function, thus allowing for
a continual feedback and learning loop. It is during the
planning function, however, that the decision-maker defines
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and bounds the mission, develops various courses of action,
and finally picks a primary and alternate course of action for
implementation. From this selected course of action, the
decision-maker then executes a function which identifies the
course of action that is being taken, schedules resources to
the functions, and generates commands to those resources
necessary for mission accomplishment.
Alliance navies have a considerable tradition of operating
in a multi-national environment. Currently, two Standing
Naval Forces (SNFs) and one On-Call Naval Force (OCNF) are in
existence. They are the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, the
Standing Naval Force Channel, and the Naval On-Call Force in
the Mediterranean. Each group trains as a multi-national,
operational unit under NATO command. The groups exercise
current NATO maritime strategy using standard operating
procedures and tactics, and participating regularly in the
major NATO maritime exercise program. These forces have
proved themselves ideal vehicles with which to display NATO
commitment, unity and capability for combined operations at
sea. (CNW Report 5-91, 1991, pp. 2-4) Although operations
with NATO countries is not the focus for this thesis, several
key ideas can be drawn from the successful deployment of NATO
forces. At an operational level, multi-national forces often
provide specific additional capabilities over and above those
provided from a single nation. In addition, depending on the
geographic setting and the national forces involved, being
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available for immediate deployment in a correctly configured
multi-national coalition provides a potent capability for
preventing or defusing a crisis, or even terminating a
conflict. Similarly, multi-national operations, in the view
of this author, may also be viewed as less provocative and,
therefore, less escalatory than those of a single nation. As
stated earlier this thesis does not focus on what currently
exists, that of the ability to work with NATO countries;
instead, it deals with those countries that are not operated
with on a continual basis, but whose service the United States
might well be working with. In recent memory, this came to
the forefront in the Desert Shield / Desert Storm campaign.
B. DATA/ INFORMATION FUSION ARCHITECTURE DESIGN
In Chapter IV, the author discussed the structural
analysis which is the basis for the multi-national generic
force architecture presented later in this chapter; and,
displayed in Appendix B. The translation of this functional
model to a physical architecture requires a hierarchial
breakdown of the functions into subfunctions, and then
assigning these functions and subfunctions to resources.
Before actually discussing the physical architecture, there
are a number of implementation characteristics, of the
architecture, that must first be considered:
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• Definition of mission or operational specifications
• Definition of system functions
• Allocation of system functions
• Development of courses of action
• Analysis and choice of a course of action
(Waltz and Llinas, 1990, p. 349)
1. Define System Level Requirements
Mission or operational requirements, referred to as
system level requirements, are defined by the operator based
on a formal statement of operational need (SON) . This is done
in order to describe effectiveness in the broadest terms. The
statement of need for the development of this thesis is two
fold; from experience in the fleet as a Combat Information
Center Officer on board USS Mississippi (CGN 40) , and as one
of ADM Macke's goals as J-6. Specifically, his goal is to
provide a guideline for the United States Navy to operate
efficiently with any given ally on a 'come as you are basis'.
This will best apply in Contingency and Limited Objective
Warfare (CALOW) operations as well as Low Intensity Conflict
(LIC)
.
The definition of mission requirements is given by the
highest level of system specification, and these system
specifications are usually referred to as A-Level
specifications. Such A-Level specifications could include
surveillance, target identification accuracy, and so on. For
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the purposes of the generic multi-national architecture, the
author has defined the following A-Level specifications:
• National Doctrine, for all nationalities committed to the
force.
• Mission Directives, determines what warfare area the force
will conduct.
• Rules of Engagement, determines what is hostile act,
intent, and force.
• Unit Capabilities, a physical description of not only the
existing capabilities, but the status of the equipment and
reliability.
• Environmental Constraints, includes both terrain and
weather conditions.
• Physical Targets, for such things like target nomination
rate and information load capabilities.
• Target Data, a quantity that takes into account accuracy
of incoming data and timeliness of data.
• Coordination Information, which includes the typical
portions of an Annex K (Communications plan, cryptology
keys available for share and use, etc.).
• Assets Available, which U. S. forces are going to be
committed to the coalition.
• Supporting Resources, to include not only foreign combat
forces, but logistics as well.
• Undamaged Neutrals, to insure that safety for those
operating near a combat zone, and are not involved.
• Unmolested Friendlies, to ensure that no blue on blue
engagements take place.
• Destroyed Enemy, the ultimate goal in a hot war in order
to achieve superiority in the opponents mind, therefore
realizing victory.
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2 . System Functions
The mission requirements are converted to functional
performance requirements at the system level, requiring
decomposition of the system into functional subsystems. This
process of decomposing the higher-level requirements to lower-
level requirements is the essence of the hierarchial, layered
architecture that the author proposes, and must include such
items as capacity of the resources to handle a number of
targets, target update rate, sensor requirements,
communication requirements, processing requirements, display
requirements, and test and evaluation requirements. The set
of required operational functions that the author used is
presented in Appendix A. Those functions, along with the
system level requirements listed above, are summarized by
Figure 5.1. Mapping of these functions onto physical elements
must occur at each of the following levels of force posture:
• Association and Attribute Refinement
• Situation Assessment
• Threat Assessment (Waltz, 1990, pp. 358-360)
a. Force Posture
With the introduction of multiple sensors,
associated data is generally appended to the target records to
expand the role of the track file to that of a target data
























(i.e., the capabilities of physical things
Resources needed to carryout the process)
FIGURE 5.1: TOP LEVEL PROCESSES
information contains target attributes, as well as sensor
attributes. This information is stored in a data base that
contains data alignment, correlation, tracking and
identification, and, situation and threat assessments.
Jb. Data Base
For the most efficient architecture, it is
necessary for threat levels incorporating the hostile or
friendly military situation and the hostile force threat
assessments to be knowledge based data subsystems. This would
allow the data base to include the following:
• Rules, networks, or other hierarchical methods used to
describe entities or events to be identified on the basis
of attributes.
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• Rules for making hard-decisions for presentation of
situation or threat data to the decision-maker.
• Time sequence patterns of events and activities that
uniquely identify behavior.
• Spatial patterns of entities and events that identify
behavior.
• Storage of intermediate scene level hypotheses that
describe the situation or threat. (Waltz, 1990, p. 359)
Of course, if the knowledge data base is used, it
must divide the incoming information into three distinct
classes of information; short-term knowledge, mid-term
knowledge, and long-term knowledge. Short-term knowledge is
that information that is re-processed and buffered for target
state and target attribution data. Mid-term knowledge is the
organization of short-term knowledge into a perception of the
current situation. This knowledge is maintained in a dynamic
environment, constantly updated as the situation assessment
process estimates the state of the targets, events, and
activities. This also is a shared data base with which
multiple assessment processes may interact, and then mutually
evaluate the data. Long-term knowledge is the static factual
and procedural knowledge that supports control and reasoning.
This would be highly important in a multi-national force, as




The idea here is to assign functions to physical
system components such as sensors, processors, software, and
communication links. Analysis and modeling of command and
control systems require four separate but related dimensions
of description. They are as follows:
• Process: an automated function, a human task, a
procedure, or an algorithm.
• Resource: a physical mechanism, a human, a geographic
location, or a node.
• Organizational Element: a subdivisions unit, or an
individual.
• Goal: a performance objective, or an intended result.
(Kapasouris et al., 1989, pp. 1-2)
The dimensions of description are important for functional
allocation, because of the problem of mapping functions to
resources. Mapping any function to a any resource could be
done very quickly, but very probably would be inefficient.
Optimal mapping of functions to resources, some of which may
be organizational elements, in order to meet specified
performance objectives or goals while taking into account
various types of constraints, is the goal of the four
dimensions listed above.
The goal of the multi-national architecture is to
accomplish assigned coalition missions successfully and
efficiently. Each individual mission contains functions,
constrained with the idea that the functions must be completed
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in a certain order (according to plan) . For the template
presented by the author, the top level functions are broken














FIGURE 5.2: DEC P LEVEL FUNCTIONS
Taking this with the notion that the organization is also
decomposed into individual operating elements or units, and
that the communication links and nodes define the hierarchy in
the organization, points to the fact that each resource has
different capabilities. This further functional decomposition
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FIGURE 5.3:
direct action units by the combat units
DECOMPOSITION OF TOP LEVEL FUNCTIONS TO THE THIRD LEVEL
Work has been done by ALPHATECH, Inc., and already they have
produced an optimal function mapping algorithm called Mapper.
Specifically, Mapper is a microcomputer based tool that uses
a novel optimization algorithm to map missions and goals onto
organizations. (Kapasouris et al., 1989, pp. 2-3)
Due to time constraints, this author was not able
to map out all of the functions to their physical
counterparts, but in determining the actual functions that
needed to be performed, the use of the four pillars of
Copernicus, as well as the structure of Cooperative
Engagement, was beneficial. Just as the author felt time
constraints, so can multi-national coalitions. Preparation
lead time for Desert Shield / Desert Storm was very valuable,
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but it was an apparent exception to the crisis rule. Not only
did the opponent to the coalition give the multi-national
force time to organize their forces through liaison meetings,
but a host country actually provided the military
infrastructure. In the future, liaison meetings and military
infrastructure may both be missing, causing the on-scene
commander to make decisions about the effective employment of
multi-national forces at the commanders disposal.
Organization of operational plans, as well as individual
warfare areas, will both benefit by viewing the problem
through the structure presented here, and in Appendix B.
3. Implementation of the Architecture
The primary idea presented in this thesis is the
answer to the question "What do we have to do different when
linking up with a foreign ship, in order to operate across
structural, functional, and behavioral forms?." The answer
goes well beyond language communication differences, and
includes physical hardware limitations, doctrinal differences,
and weapon system capabilities. The background to answer this
question, as well as the material for content, are both listed
within this thesis. The generic command and control
architectures required operational functions are listed in
Appendix A and the functional flow lines are given in Appendix
B. The architecture begins with Multi-National Coordination
Process, and proceeds through a combination of management and
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action tasks as shown by figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, finally
stopping at the individual entity level.
In order to correctly implement the multi-national
architecture, without liaison meetings between countries
involved in the coalition, requires a quick review of
cognitive biases. This is done in order to form a heuristic
that deals with the function assignment process.
Representativeness, Availability, and Adjustment and Anchoring
are three efforts to combat cognitive biases that stem from
judgmental heuristics. Representativeness includes:
• Insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes
• Insensitivity to sample size
• Misconceptions of chance
• Insensitivity to predictability
• The illusion of validity
• Misconceptions of regression
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, pp. 258-264)
Availability, as a cognitive bias, includes:
• Biases due to the retrievability of instances
• Biases due to the effectiveness of a search set
• Biases of imaginability
• Illusory correlation
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, pp. 265-268)
Adjustment and Anchoring include:
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• Insufficient adjustment
• Evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive events
• Anchoring in the assessment of subjective probability
distributions
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, pp. 2 68-272)
After reviewing the biases that can occur in cognition, the
three heuristics presented above can help in making judgements
under uncertainty. Representativeness is employed when the
decision-maker is asked to judge the probability that a
function belongs to a certain resource. Availability is often
employed when the decision-maker is asked to assess the
reliability of a resource. Adjustment from an anchor is
employed in prediction when a relevant value is available.
Each of the three heuristics are highly economical and
effective in determining the ability to operate with given
forces in pursuit of mission accomplishment; however, they can
lead to systematic and even predictable errors.
4. Architecture Evaluation
The ideal case of multi-national tasking would be for
a commander to analyze the forces for disposal, review mission
goals, and then request the perfect match from participating
countries in the coalition. Unfortunately, this is only an
ideal case; yet, it is the imperfect cases that require
evaluation of the ability of the architecture to accomplish
baseline functions. This process of quantitative assessment
is applied in order to the military effectiveness of those
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systems. Specifically, the assessment of the architecture
must include the following questions:
• What is the best combination of sensors and sources to
meet a given set of detection probability, target
discrimination, and target location requirements?
• What level of detection, discrimination, and location
performance can be achieved through coordination of
separate platforms?
• What trade-off must be made between improvements in
information transfer and weapon system performance?
(Waltz, 1990, p. 389)
Effectiveness must be quantified, and numerous quantifiable
measures of merit can be envisioned: engagement outcomes,
exchange ratio, total targets destroyed, and so on. The
ability to relate architecture performance to military
effectiveness is difficult because of the many factors that
relate improved information to improved combat effectiveness
and the uncertainty in modeling them. Modeling and simulation
are important in determining the ability to evaluate the
architecture due to the lack of organized operational
exercises. Relating performance characteristics of the
architecture to military effectiveness in this method is
accomplished by the Military Operations Research Society's
Standards. These measures of effectiveness are summed up in
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Because of the lack of data available to measure the
performance and effectiveness of the architecture, a viable
option would be combat modeling. With human interaction in
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the architecture, algorithms modeling human behavior should be
added, or real-time man in the loop simulations employed. The
model, and more importantly the results of the model, are very
similar to the heuristics employed prior to implementation.
Therefore, it is important to remember that the models are
only simulations, with predictable errors.
The essence of this thesis is illustrated by a roadmap
of decomposition presented in this chapter; and, given in
detail in Appendix B. It is a physical checklist (template)
that could be used by an on-scene decision-maker. The
template was constructed at a level just above the physical
hardware and is aimed towards effective coordination of the
multi-national forces, by ensuring that all aspects of
coordination are covered. This template is a physical
reality, and was not just a part of a theoretical discussion.
It would and can be helpful in coordination issues, in this
author's opinion, but to do so it must be physically
implemented by the decision-maker.
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VI. CONCLUSION
"Men mean more than guns in the rating of a ship."
-John Paul Jones
A. GENERAL
The proposal of the thesis was that the Copernicus
Architecture and the structure of the Cooperative Engagement
could be interwoven into a base template, in order to be used
in a crisis situation for multi-national operations. The
premise did not include NATO forces, as there are currently
standard operating procedures when working with these
countries. Instead, the focus of the thesis dealt with those
countries that the United States might have to work with on an
ad hoc basis, not unlike the situation that just recently
occurred in the Persian Gulf.
The basics required for combined operations included
functions required for mission areas, resources needed for
these functions to be completed, data and information flows
for the flow of information, and time constrained functions.
After reviewing the command and control diagrams of past ad
hoc multi-national campaigns, the author concluded that the
coordination of these combined forces was conducted at much
too high of a level. Given the long lead time that has
occurred in the past prior to hostilities, the high level
coordination has worked up till now. However, due to the
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downsizing of the military, in conjunction with regional
conflicts, the United States role of world "policeman" will
not be able to continue without quickly formed alliances. The
dilemma exists in the fact that someone who is our ally today,
may be on the opposite end of the argument tomorrow;
therefore, necessitating the need to control the information
and intelligence flow given out to these quickly formed
alliances. The template works with these delicate issues,
allowing the decision-maker at the tactical level the
flexibility to coordinate with regional forces in order to
accomplish the mission.
B. TEMPLATE GENERATION
The generation of the template was conducted on IDEFO
software provided by SPAWARS. The idealology came from the
existing shortfalls in our current architecture, namely the
inability to mold the available warfighting doctrine to the
problem. Flexible doctrine allows for incremental changes in
the architecture, thus allowing tactics to keep pace with
technology. The whole idea behind the template was to allow
the commander to perform a variety of baseline tasks,
therefore fighting the force as a whole and hopefully
achieving an optimal pairing of platforms per individual
engagement.
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C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Template validation is an overwhelming choice for further
research. The ideas in the thesis are structurally sound in
a conceptual environment; yet, until they are tested in an
operational environment, the actual ability of the template to
achieve multi-dimension coordination is not proven.
D. COMBINED FORCES COORDINATION
The key reason for developing the combined forces
architectural template was to give the on-scene commander an
efficient and effective tool for use in coordinating the
assets available. The template gives the commander the
ability to formulate the function to resource mapping needed
to fuse multi-national assets across spatial, time, and
functional domains. Once the allocation of functions to
resources has taken place, each unit commander will have the
same fused tactical picture, complete with the same goals and
directives guiding the entire force towards mission
accomplishment. Finally, by basing the architecture on
Copernicus, the template is only constrained by a flexible




This appendix contains the Revised Master Generic Set of
Required Operational Functions (ROFs) , as outlined in SPAWAR 31
working paper dated 15 December 1988. Each ROF is related to a
major grouping of Plan, Observe, Assess, and Execute. The
application of the ROFs is to define and analyze the elements of
command and control. Each verb used in the ROF set has been
defined to eliminate the need for navy jargon. This helps to
ensure the ROFs are not inadvertently building in a bias toward any
particular time frame, mission area, or system implementation.
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Revised Master Generic Set of
Required Operational Functions (ROFs)
to be Accomplished bv a CVBF
1.0(P,A) Plan Force Mission (F,WP)
(Old 1 .0 and 2.0)
1.1.(P) Define Force Mission (R (OLD 1.1.1)
(Old 1.1.1 ; NOTE : Old 1 .1 is deleted and all linkages are mapped to
NEW 1.1 above)
1.1.1 (P) Define Force Mission Objectives (F)
1 .1 .2(P) Define Warfare Mission Area Requirements of Force Mission (F)
1.1 .3(P) Define Force Movement Requirements Associated with the Force
Mission (F)
1.2(P,A) Bound Force Mission (F.WP)
(Old 1 .2 and 1 .3 Combined; all linkages to Old 1 .2
and Old 1 .3 are mapped to the New 1 .2 Above)
1.2.1 (P) Define Overall Force Composition (F)
1.2.2(P) Define Own System Design Capabilities (F.WP)
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1 .2.3(P) Define Enemy Forces Expected to be Encountered
During Mission (F.WP)
1.2.4(P) Define Enemy System Design Capabilities (F.WP)
1 .2.5(P) Define Neutral Presence Expected to be in the Mission Area
(F.WP)
1.2.6(P) Define Mission Constraints (F.WP)
(Old 1.3.2)
1 .2.6.1 (P) Define Constraints on Own Actions (F.WP)
(New; lower level decomposition of old 1 .3.2)
1.2.6.2(P) Define Constraints on Enemy Actions (F.WP)
(New; lower level decomposition of Old 1.3.2)
1 .2.7(A) Assess Adequacy of Own Planned Warfighting Capabilities with
respect to Anticipated Enemy Capabilities (F,WP)
(Old 1.3.1)
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1 .3( P) Develop Command. Control, and Communications
(C3) Plans (F.WP)
(Old 2.1.8, 2.2 and 2.3)
1.3.1 (P) Define Force Command Structure (F)
(Old 2.1.1)
1 .3.2(P) Develop Plans for Primary/Secondary WMA Assignments of WPs (F)
(Old 2.2.1 and 2.2.2)
1.3.3(P) Develop Force Disposition Plans (F)
(Old 2.2.4)
1.3.4(P) Develop Communications Plans (F.WP)
(Old 2.4.1)
1.3.5(P) Develop Standard Operating Plans/Procedures (F.WP)
(Old 2.1.4 and old 2.3.1; NOTE: All linkages to old 2.3.1 are mapped
to new 1.3.5 above)
1 .3.6(P) Develop Plans/Procedures for Resolving Conflicts in System
Utilization Outside Primary Warfare Area (F, WP)
(Old 2.2.3)
1.3.7(P) Develop Safety Plans, Policies, Rules and Procedures (F,WP)
(Old 2.3.2)
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1 .4(P) Develop Detailed WMA Plans (F.WP1
(Old 2.1 ; NOTE: Old 2.0 is deleted and all linkages are mapped to
new 1 .4 above)
1 .4.1 (P) Develop Force-Level WMA Area of Interest (AOI)/Battle Space Plans
(F)
(Old 2.1.2)
1.4.2(P) Develop Force-Level WMA Rules of Engagement (ROE) Plans (F)
(Old 2.1.3)
1 .4.3(P) Develop Force-Level WMA Special Duty Assignment Plans (F)
(Old 2.2.5)
1 .4.4(P) Develop WMA Surveillance/Reconnaissance Plans and Tactics
(F,WP)
(Old 2.1.5)
1 .4.5(P) Develop WMA Hard-Kill Engagement Plans and Tactics (F.WP)
(Old 2.1.6)
1 .4.6(P) Develop WMA EW/C3CM/Acoustic Warfare Engagement Plans and
Tactics (F.WP)
(Old 2.1.7)
1 .4.7(P) Develop Detailed Plans and Tactics Unique to a Given WMA (F,WP)
(New; subsumes Old 2.1
.9)
*
= Includes NWP1 A "Fundamental Tasks" (AAW, ASW, ASUW,
STK, AMW, and MIW), plus the following "Supporting Tasks"
(NSW, INTEL, Ocean Surveillance/Space)
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1.5(P) Develop Logistic Support Plans (F.WP)
(Old 2.4)
1.5.1 (P) Develop Supply Readiness Plans (F.WP)
(Old 2.4.3)
1 .5.2(P) Develop Warfighting Equipment Readiness/Damage Control Plans
(F.WP)
(Old 2.4.2)
1.5.3(P) Develop Training Readiness Plans (F,WP)
(Old 2.4.4)
1.6(P) Develop Plans for Post Operations Mission Analysis (F.WP)
(Old 2.4.5)
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2.1(E) Establish Communications Networks (F.WP)
(Old 4.2.1 plus Old 4.2.3)
2.2(E) Conduct Communications (F.WP)
(Old 5.4.4; all of the current linkages to
Old 5.4.4 are mapped to New 2.2 above)
2.3(0) Observe Status of Communications (F.WP)
(Old 4.2.2)
2.4(A) Assess Status of Communications (F.WP)
(New)
96
(Rev. 15 DEC 88)
3.0(O,A, E) Control Force Movements (F,WP)
(1 st half of Old 4.0, plus Old 4.1 .1
)
3.1(0) Observe Force Navigational Position (F.WP)
(Old 5.1.1)
3.2(0) Observe Accurate Measurements of Time (F.WP)
(Old 5.1.2)
3.3(E) Execute Force Stationing/Maneuvering Plans (F.WP)
(New)
3.3.1(E) Execute Ship Stationing/Maneuvering Plans (F.WP)
(Old 4.1.2, plus Old 7.1.1)
(NOTE: Old 7.1 .1 .2 is deleted and all linkages are mapped to new
3.3.1 above)
3.3.2(E) Execute Submarine Stationing/Maneuvering Plans (F.WP)
(Old 4.1.3)
3.3.3(E) Execute Aircraft Stationing/Maneuvering Plans (F,WP)
(Old 4.1.4 and 4.1.5)
(NOTE: Old 7.1 .1 .1 is deleted and all linkages are mapped to 3.3.3
above)
3.4(A) Assess Execution of Force Movements (F)
(New)
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4.0(O,A,E) Maintain Battle Readiness (F,WP)
(2nd half of Old 4.0)
4.1.(0,A,E) Maintain Supply Readiness (F.WP)
(Old 4.3)
4.1.1(0) Observe Supply Readiness (F.WP)
(Old 4.3.1)
4.1 .2(A) Assess Supply Readiness (F.WP)
(New)
4.1.3(E) Execute Replenishment (F.WP)
(Old 4.3.2)
4.2(0,A,E) Maintain Readiness of Warfighting Equipment and
Platforms (F.WP)
( Old 4.4)
4.2.1(E) Configure Equipment (F.WP)
(Old 4.4.2)
4.2.2(0) Observe Equipment Configuration /Availability/Battle Damage
(F.WP)
(Old 4.4.1)
4.2.3(A) Assess Equipment Readiness/Battle Damage (F,WP)
(New)
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4.2.4(E) Execute Equipment Maintenance Plans/Repair Battle Damage (F.WP)
(Old 4.4.3)
4.3(0,A,E) Maintain Training Readiness (F.WP)
(Old 4.5)
4.3.1(0) Observe Training Readiness (F.WP)
(Old 4.5.1)
4.3.2(A) Assess Training Readiness (F,WP)
(New)
4.3.3(E) Conduct Training (F.WP)
(Old 4.5.3)
( NOTE: Old 4.5.2 is deleted; and all linkages are mapped to New 4.3.3 above)
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5.0(O,A,E) Develop Tactical Picture (F,WP)
(Old 5.0)
5.1(0,A,E) Develop Environmental Information (F.WP)
(2nd half of Old 5.1)
5.1.1(0) Acquire Oceanographic Information (F,WP)
(1 st half of 5.1 .2, further subdivided)
5.1.2(0) Acquire Atmospheric Information (F,WP)
(1 st half of 5.1 .2, further subdivided)
5.1.3(0) Acquire Historical Environmental Information (F.WP)
(2nd half of Old 5.1.2)
5.1.4(A) Assess Environmental Information (F.WP)
(New)
5.1 .5(E) Implement Environmental Considerations into
Operations (F.WP)
(2nd half of old 5.1 .2, further subdivided)
5.2(0,E) Develop Integrated Tactical Information (F.WP)
(Old 5.4)
5.2.1(E) Execute Non-Organic Surveillance/Reconnaissance Plan (F.WP)
(Old 5.2.1)
(NOTE: Old 5.2 is deleted and all linkages are split between new 5.2.1 and 5.2.2)
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5.2.2(E) Execute Organic Surveillance/Reconnaissance Plan (F, WP)
5.2.2.1 (E
)
Conduct Search with Organic Sensors (F, WP)
(Old 5.3.1)
(NOTE: Old 5.3.1 .1 and 5.3.1 .2 are deleted and all linkages are mapped to new 5.2.2.1
above)
5.2.2.2(0) Identify Contacts (F.WP)
(Old 5.3.2)
5.2.2.3(0) Track Contacts (F.WP)
(Old 5.3.3)
5.2.3(E) Establish a Common Force Coordinate System (Gridlock) (F)
(Old 5.4.1)
5.2.4(0) Correlate INTEL Information as received (F,WP)
(Old 5.4.2.1)
5.2.5(0) Correlate All-Source Track Information as Received (F.WP)
(Old 5.4.2.)
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5.2.5.2(0) Correlate Non-Organic to Organic Track Information as Received
(F.WP)
(Old 5.4.2.3)
5.2.5.3(0) Correlate Organic to Organic Track Information as Received (F,WP)
(Old 5.4.2.4)
5.3(0) Generate Tactical Picture (F.WP)
(Old 5.4.3 is deleted and all linkages are mapped to new 5.4
above)
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6.0(A) Assess Tactical Situation (F,WP)
(1st half of Old 6.0)
6.1(A) Assess Developing Threat (F.WP)
(Old 6.1)
6.1 .1 (A) Evaluate Threat Warnings and Reports as Received (F.WP)
(Old 6.1.1)
(NOTE: Old 6.1 .2 is deleted; all linkages are mapped to new 6.1 .1 above)
6.1 .2(A) Assess Implications of Rules of Engagement (ROE) to Unfolding
Tactical/Threat Situation (F.WP)
(Old 6.4.3)
(NOTE: Old 6.2.1 is deleted and all linkages are mapped to new 6.1.2 above)
(NOTE: Old 6.4 is deleted and all linkages are mapped to new 6.1 .2 above)
(NOTE: Old 6.4.1 is deleted and all linkages are mapped to new 6.1.2 above)
(NOTE: Old 6.4.2 is deleted and all linkages are mapped to new 6.1.2 above)
6.1.3(A) Prioritize Incoming Threats (F.WP)
(Old 6.3.2)
(NOTE: Old 6.3.1 is deleted and all linkages are mapped to 6.1 .3 above)
(NOTE: Old 6.2 is deleted and all linkages are mapped to new 7.4.1 below)
6.1 .4(A) Assess Impact of Neutral Presence/Activities (F.WP)
(New)
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6.2(A) Assess Own* and Enemy Effectiveness Before and Purina
Engagement (F.WP)
(Old 3.1)
6.2.1 (A) Assess Effectiveness of Own C3 Plans and Doctrines Before and
During Engagement (F.WP)
(Old 3.1.4)
(Note: 2nd half of Old 3.1 .1 is deleted and all linkages thereto are mapped to new 6.2.
i
above)
6.2.2(A) Assess Effectiveness of Own Surveillance Plans and Doctrines
Before and During Engagement (F.WP)
(1st half of Old 3.1.1)
6.2.3(A) Assess Effectiveness of Own Hard-Kill Engagement Plans and
Doctrines During Engagement (F,WP)
(Old 3.1.3)
(NOTE: Old 3.1 .3.1 is deleted; all linkages are mapped to new 6.2.3 above)
(NOTE: Old 3.1 .3.2 is deleted; all linkages are mapped to new 6.2.3 above)
(NOTE: Old 3.1 .3.3 is deleted; all linkages are mapped to new 6.2.3 above)
6.2.4(A) Assess Effectiveness of Own EW/C3CM/Acoustic Warfare
Engagement Plans During Engagement (F.WP)
(New)
6.2.5(A) Assess Overall Effectiveness of the Enemy Attack During Engagement
(F.WP)
(Old 3.2.2)
(NOTE: Old 3.2 is deleted and all linkages are mapped to 6.2.5 above)
(NOTE: Old 3.2.1 is deleted and all linkages are mapped to new 6.2.5 above)
*Own includes allies as appropriate
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6.2.6(A) Assess Vulnerabilities Exhibited by the Enemy During Engagement
(F.WP)
(Old 3.2.3)
6.3(E,A) Assess Own Effectiveness at the Completion of
the Engagement/Mission (F.WP)
(Old 3.3)
6.3.1 (E) Collect Data Required for Post-Engagement Mission Assessment
(F.WP)
(Old 3.3.1)
6.3.2(A) Assess Own Effectiveness in Supporting Mission
Accomplishment at Completion of Engagement (F.WP)
(Old 3.3.2)
(NOTE: Old 3.3.4 is deleted and all its linkages are mapped into New 6.3.2)
(NOTE: Old 3.3.5 is deleted and all of its linkages are mapped into New 6.3.2]
105
(Rev. 15 DEC 88)
7.0 (E) Execute Engagement Actions (F,WP)
(2nd half of Old 6.0 and all of Old 7.0)
7.1(E) Execute Force-Level Control Actions During
Engagement (F)
(Old 6.5)
7.1 .1 (E) Execute Force-Level Readiness/Warning Conditions (F)
(Old 6.2.2)
7.1 .2(E) Execute Weapons Free/Weapons Tight at the Force Level (F)
(Old 6.5.1)
7.1 .3(E) Authorize at the Force Level the Use of Special Weapons for Hard-Kill
Engagements (F)
(Old 6.5.4)
7.2(E) Implement Pre-Planned Engagement Doctrines (F.WP)
(Old 7.1.2)
(NOTE: Old 7.1 .2.1 is deleted and all linkages are mapped to new 7.2 above)
(NOTE: Old 7.1 .2.2 is deleted and all linkages are mapped to new 7.2 above)
7.3(E) Enforce Coordination Procedures During Engagement
(F,WP)
(Old 6.5.6 plus Old 7.1.3)
7.4(E) Enforce Safety Procedures During Engagement (F.WP)
(Old 6.5.5 plus Old 7.1.4)
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7.5(E) Engage the Threat (F. WP)
(Old 7.0)
7.5.1(E) Execute Engagements with Hard-Kill Systems (F, WP)
(Old 6.5.2 and 7.2)
7.5.1 .1 (E) Execute Close-In Self-Defensive Engagements with Hard-Kill Systems
(F, WP)
(Old 7.2.1)
7.5.1.2(E) Execute Area Engagements with Hard-Kill Weapons Systems (WP)
(Old 6.5.2 and 7.2.2)
7.5.1 .2.1 (E) Execute Outer Area Engagements with Hard-Kill Weapons Systems
(F, WP)
(Old 6.5.2.1 and 7.2.2.1)
7.5.1 .2.2(E) Execute Inner Area Engagements with Hard-Kill Weapons Systems
(F, WP)
(Old 6.5.2.2 and 7.2.2.2)
7.5.2(E) Execute Electronic Warfare/Acoustic Warfare Engagements (F, WP)
(Old 6.5.3 and 7.3)
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7.5.2.1 .1 (E) Execute Close-in Self-Defensive EW/C3CM Engagements (F.WP)
(New)
7.5.2.1 .2(E) Execute Close-In Self-Defensive Acoustic Warfare Engagements
(F.WP)
(New)
7.5.2.2(E) Execute Area Electronic Warfare/C3CM and Acoustic Warfare
Engagements (F, WP)
(Old 6.5.3, 6.5.3.1, 6.5.3.2 and 7.3.2)
7.5.2.2.1 (E) Execute Operational Security (OPSEC) Operations (F, WP)
(Old 6.5.3 and 7.3.2.1)
7.5.2.2.2(E) Execute Operational Deception (OPDEC) Operations (F, WP)
(Old 6.5.3 and 7.3.2.2)
7.5.2.2.3(E) Execute Area Electronic Jamming Engagements (F, WP)
(Old 6.5.3 and 7.3.2.3)
7.5.2.2.4(E) Execute Area Acoustic Warfare Engagements (WP)
(New)
7.5.4(E) Execute Non-Combat Operations (F, WP)
(Old 7.5)
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7.6(0) Observe Engagement Status/Results (F.WP)
(Old 7.1.5)





The 1 5 DEC 88 Revised Master Generic ROFs are annotated to indicate the
changes that have been made to the 30 MAR 88 Master Generic ROFs.
(2) The letter codes incorporated into the ROF short-titles have the following
meanings:
(P) = The indicated ROF is a "PLANMype ROF
(O) = The indicated ROF is an "OBSERVE"-type ROF
(A) = The indicated ROF is an MASSESS"-type ROF
(E) = The indicated ROF is an "EXECUTE H-type ROF
(F ) = The indicated ROF is a Force-level ROF
(F,WP) = The indicated ROF is both a Force-Level ROF and A Weapons
Platform-Level ROF
(3) A Glossary of action verbs for ROF generation follows below.
It explictly defines the verbs used in this Master Generic ROF set.
Additional verb definitions are provided for the generation of WMA
specific ROFs as necessary.
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GLOSSARY OF ACTION VERBS FOR ROF GENERATION
1
.
ACQUIRE - To come into possession or control of.
2. ALLOCATE - To apportion for a specific purpose or to particular persons
or things.
3. ANALYZE - To study or determine the nature and relationship of the parts
of by analysis.
4. APPLY - To put into operation or effect.
5. ARCHIVE - To file or collect information in records, or documents.
6. ASSESS - To determine the nature of e.g. importance, size, value, etc.
7. ASSIGN - To transfer to another.
8. ATTACK - To set upon with violent force.
9. AUTHORIZE - To establish by or as if by authority.
10. BOUND - To set the limits or bounds to.
1 1
.
CHARACTERIZE - To describe the character or quality of.
1 2. CLASSIFY - To organize or arrange according to class or category.
1 3. COLLECT - To bring together into one body or place.
14. COMMUNICATE - To transmit information, thought, or feeling so that
it is satisfactorily received, or understood.
1 5. COMPARE - To examine so as to note the similarities or differences of.
1 6. COMPILE - To collect and edit into a volume.
1 7. CONDUCT - To guide or lead.
18. CONFIGURE - To set up for operation especially in a particular way.
1 9. CONTROL - To exercise authority or influence over.
20. COOPERATE - To associate with another or others for mutual benefit.
21
.
COORDINATE - To bring into common action, movement, or condition.
no
22. CORRELATE - To show a causal relationship between, to present or set
forth so as to show relationship.
23. COUNTER - To move or act in opposition to.
24. CREATE - To produce or bring about by a course of action or behavior.
25. CUE - To give a hint or prompt to.
26. DECEIVE - To cause to believe what is not true.
27. DECIPHER - To convert into intelligible form.
28. DECOY - To lure or entice.
29. DEFINE - To describe the nature or basic qualities of.
30. DELEGATE - To entrust to another.
31
.
DEPLOY - To station systematically over an area.
32. DESCRIBE - To represent or give an account of in words.
33. DETECT - To discover or discern the existence, or fact of.
34. DETERMINE - To settle or decide by choice of alternatives or possibilities.
35. DEVELOP - To set forth or make clear by degrees or in detail.
36. DISCRIMINATE - To mark or perceive the distinguishing or peculiar
features of.
37. DISRUPT - To interrupt or impede the usual course or harmony of.
38. DOCUMENT - To furnish documentary evidence of.
39. EMPLOY - To make use of.
40. ENCRYPT - To convert into cipher or code form.
41
.
ENFORCE - To compel observance of or obedience to.
42. ENGAGE - To enter into conflict or contest with.
43. ENHANCE - To add or contribute to as to improve or increase.
44. ESTABLISH - To bring into existence.
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45. ESTIMATE -To determine tentatively or approximately the value,
worth, significance, size, extent, or nature of.
46. EVADE - To escape or avoid by cunning.
47. EVALUATE - To determine the significance or worth of.
48. EXCHANGE - To engage in an act of reciprocal giving and receiving.
49. EXECUTE - To carryout fully a declared intent or plan.
50. EXERCISE - To make effective in action.
51
.
FORMULATE - To put into a systemized statement or expression.
52. GENERATE - To define or originate by the application of one or
more rules or operations to given quantities.
53. IDENTIFY - To find out the distinct origin, nature, or definitive elements of.
54. IMPLEMENT - To give practical effect to and ensure of actual fulfillment
by concrete measures.
55. INFORM - To give information, knowledge, or understanding.
56. INITIATE - To cause or facilitate the beginning of.
57. INTERRUPT - To break the uniformity or continuity of.
58. JAM - To make unintelligible by sending out interfering signals
or messages.
59. LEARN - To gain information, knowledge, or understanding.
60. LIMIT - To restrict to set bounds or limits.
61 LOCALIZE - To attribute to a specific locality.
62. LOCATE - To determine or specify the position or boundaries of.
63. MAINTAIN - To preserve from failure or decline.
64. MANAGE - To handle or direct with a degree of skill.
65. MANEUVER - To alter the tactical placement of.
66. MEASURE - To estimate or appraise by a criterion.
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67. MERGE - To combine, as sets of data.
68. MODIFY - To make basic or fundamental changes in.
69. MONITOR - To keep watch over: Supervise.
70. NAVIGATE - To operate or control the course of.
71
.
OBSERVE - To come to realize or know through directed careful
analytic attention or consideration of noted facts.
72. OBTAIN - To gain or attain usually by planned action or effort.
73. ORDER - To give an order to: command.
74. PARTITION - To divide into parts or shares.
75. PLAN - To devise a detailed formulation for or project the
realization or achievement of.
76. POSITION - To put in proper position by the act of placing or arranging.
77. POSTULATE - To assume or claim as true, existent, or necessary.
78. PREDICT - To declare in advance: foretell on the basis of
observation, experience, or scientific reason.
79. PREPARE - To make ready beforehand for some purpose,
use, or activity.
80. PRIORITIZE - To arrange or deal with in order of importance.
81 PROTECT - To cover or shield from exposure, injury, or destruction.
82. RECEIVE - To come into possession of.
83. RECONSTITUTE - To restore to a former condition.
84. RECONSTRUCT - To reestablish or reassemble.
85. RELATE - To show or establish logical or causal connection between.
86. REPAIR - To restore to sound condition after damage or injury.
87. REPORT - To give an account of.
88. RESOLVE - To work out the resolution of, to deal with successfully.
89. SCHEDULE - To appoint, assign or designate for a fixed time.
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90. SEARCH - To examine in order to find something lost or concealed.
91
.
SELECT - To take by preference from a number or group of.
92. SEND - To cause to be carried to a destination.
93. SORT - To arrange according to characteristics.
94. SPECIFY - To state explicitly.
95. STORE - To reserve or put away for future use.
96. SUPPLY - To make available for use or equip with.
97. SURVEIL - To keep close watch over.
98. SUSTAIN - To give support or relief to. To supply with sustenance.
99. TAILOR - To make or adapt to suit a special need or purpose.
1 00. TEST - To apply a test as a means of analysis or diagnosis.
101. TRACK - To monitor the course of.
1 02. TRAIL - To follow the traces of.
103. TRAIN - To teach so as to make fit, qualified, or proficient.
104. TRANSFORM - To change the composition, structure, character,
or condition of.
1 05. UPDATE - To bring up to date: make current.
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APPENDIX B
The framework of the Multi-National Coordination Process was
constructed using the Computer Aided Systems Engineering (CASE)
methodology. The CASE tool used was the SPAWAR 31 standard,
Design/IDEF 1.5, executed on a Macintosh computer. Design/ IDEF is
more than a set of drawings. It is a data base of functional
processes and associated data flows.
Each Design/IDEF drawing is broken down into further
components, as listed by the number in the lower righthand corner
of each functional box (i.e. 1, 1.1, 1.1.1). Each functional box
has inputs from the left, controls of those inputs from the top,
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